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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-Social Security Act Granting Benefits to Women
Only Violates Equal Protection.-On June 5, 1972, Paula Wiesenfeld died
in childbirth, survived by her husband, Stephen, and infant son, Jason. She
had worked as a teacher during the seven years preceding her death. During
the year and a half of their marriage, Paula's salary, which far exceeded
Stephen's, provided the main support for the family.' Upon Paula's death,
Jason became eligible for child's insurance benefits under the social security
law.2 Stephen obtained these, but was denied other benefits payable to a
surviving spouse entrusted with the care of such a child. 3 Only women were
entitled to these so-called "mother's benefits."'4 Stephen Wiesenfeld challenged
the statute as violative of the equal protection guarantee incorporated into the
fifth amendment.5 A three-judge district court invalidated the statute, 6 and
the Supreme Court affirmed without dissent, finding it unnecessary to adopt
the lower court's holding that classifications based upon sex are inherently
suspect. 7 In its affirmance, the Supreme Court applied the traditional analysis
of equal protection challenges, the so-called rational basis test,8 in a vigorous
1. In 1970 Paula earned $9808; Stephen earned $3100. In 1971 Paula earned $10,686; Stephen
$2188. In 1972 Paula earned $6836; Stephen $2475. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F.
Supp. 981, 984 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
2. "Every child .. . of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual ... shall
be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month .... " 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970), as
amended, (Supp. I, 1972).
3. "The widow and every surviving divorced mother.. . of an individual who died a fully or
currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving divorced mother . . . has in her care a
child of such individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit, . . . shall . . . be entitled to a
mother's insurance benefit .... " Id. § 402(g) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
4. A legislator has described the basis of this reasoning: "The income security programs of
this nation were designed for a land of male and female stereotypes, a land where all men were
breadwinners and all women were wives or widows; where men provided necessary income for
their families but women did not; in other words, where all of the men supported all of the
women. This view of the world never matched reality, but today it is further than ever from the
truth." Griffiths, Sex Discrimination in Income Security Programs, 49 Notre Dame Law. 534
(1974). See generally Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 Hastings
L.J. 277 (1971); Note, Sex Classifications in the Social Security Benefit Structure, 49 Ind. L.J.
181 (1973).
5. "[W~hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimi-
nation that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.' " Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S.
163, 168 (1964). The federal government is required to meet the same standards as those imposed
upon the states by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
6. 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973).
7. Id. at 990.
8. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), the Court explained this test in a
challenge to a state's Sunday closing laws. It said that the fourteenth amendment allows the
states-and, by implication, the fifth amendment allows the federal government-wide discretion
in enacting laws which establish classifications of individuals. "The constitutional safeguard
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manner. 9 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
Equal protection attacks upon statutes classifying upon the basis of sex
reach far back into United States history.' 0 In Muller v. Oregon," the
Supreme Court, finding sex to be a valid classification, upheld a state statute
that prohibited the employment of women in a factory or aundry for more
[equal protection] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective." Id. at 425. In applying this test, the Court said that 'lal
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it-" Id. at 426; see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065,
1077-47 (1969), which demonstrates that application of this standard rarely resulted in the
invalidation of the challenged statute. It has been described as tile "traditionally toothless" test.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gunther]. A more demanding standard of equal protection is the so-called
"strict scrutiny" test or the "new equal protection." When either an inherently suspect classifica-
tion or a fundamental interest is involved, the Court subjects the statute to strict scrutiny,
demanding that the state show that the statute serves a compelling interest. See generally
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1087-133 (1969). Use of
this strict scrutiny test has usually resulted in the overturning of the challenged law. Gunther, supra
at 8. The Burger Court has been unwilling to expand the categories of suspect classifications and
fundamental interests. Id. at 12-13.
9. A "newer" equal protection standard has been discerned in the Court's use of the clause "as
an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict scrutiny language of the new equal
protection." Gunther, supra note 8, at 12; see Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the
Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Geo. L.J.
1071 (1974); Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis & A Proposal, 41 Fordham L.
Rev. 605 (1973); Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975
Duke L.J. 163. The test under this "newer" standard focuses on the means used by the legislature to
further its purpose and eliminates the Court's traditional "extreme deference to imaginable support-
ing facts and conceivable legislative purposes." Gunther, supra note 8, at 21. The test involves
"relatively vigorous scrutiny.., more interventionist than the Warren Court's applications of old
equal protection formulas [b]ut... considerably less strict than the new (i.e., 'strict scrutinyl equal
protection." Id. For instances of the application of this newer standard see id. at 25-37. See also
the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651,
653-54 (1974) (overrestrictive maternity leave provisions violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment). Justice Powell would have decided the issue on equal protection groands,
seeing no rational relation between the classification of groups of teachers and the school board's
interest in continuity of instruction.
10. More than a century ago, Myra Bradwell challenged an Illinois statute that limited the
practice of law to males. In Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872), the Court did not
consider her appeal under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment, presumably because of its previous decision in Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 81 (1872), that these provisions applied solely to discrimination based upon race. The
Court upheld the Illinois statute as consistent with "the law of the Creator," stating that the
"paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother." Bradwell v. Illinois, supra at 141. The statute did not violate the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment because the right to "engage in any and every
profession, occupation, or employment in civil life" was not among the privileges and immunities
of citizens. Id. at 140.
11. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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than ten hours a day. It said that a "woman's physical structure and the
performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle
for subsistence... ',2 and that the physical well-being of women is "an object
of public interest.' 3 The difference between the sexes, said the Court,
"justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to
compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her."'1 4 This combination
of stereotypes and paternalism has often shown itself in decisions of the
Court. 15
The invalidation of sex-based classifications on equal protection grounds, ' 6
began with Reed v. Reed, 17 in which a unanimous Court overturned an Idaho
statute mandating a preference for males over females as administrators of
estates.' 8 The Court purported to employ the traditional rational basis
analysis and looked at the asserted purpose of the statute, namely, the
reduction of the work-load of probate courts. This end was deemed to be "not
without some legitimacy."' 9 The significance of Reed lay in the next step of
12. Id. at 421.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 422-23. The Court found it necessary to distinguish its earlier decision invalidating,
as a limitation upon the right to contract, a New York law that had set a ten hour daily
maximum for all bakery employees. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. In Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), the purpose of a Michigan statute prohibiting
the licensing of a woman as a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of
the bar, was found to be the prevention of "moral and social problems." Id. at 466. The Court
did not question the state's belief that the statute was related to this purpose. See Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding statute according women an absolute exemption from
jury service because of their "special responsibilities" as "the center of home and family life'). But
see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). See generally Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination
By Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 675 (1971).
16. The Court has also used a due process analysis to strike down sexual discrimination.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
This analysis, distinct from that of equal protection, will not be treated here. For a thoughtful
comparison of the analyses involved in both equal protection and due process, see Johnston, Sex
Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 617, 629-35 (1974).
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Lower federal and state court decisions overturning sexual discrimina-
tion helped to change the legal climate. See Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F.
Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (invalidated the exclusion of women from a bar); Kirstein v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (invalidated sexually
restricted admissions policy at the University of Virginia); Mollere v. Southeastern La.
College, 304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969) (invalidated law requiring unmarried women, but not
men, under 21 to live in college dormitories); White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966)
(invalidated exclusion of women from jury service); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (declared sex to be a suspect classification; invalidated the
exclusion of women from bartending); In re Estate of Legatos, I Cal. App. 3d 657, 81 Cal. Rptr.
910 (3d Dist. 1969) (invalidated a sex-discriminatory inheritance law); Commonwealth v. Daniel,
430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968) (invalidated longer prison sentences for women than for men).
18. "Of several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer [an estate], males must be
preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the half blood." Idaho Code § 15-314
(1948). This statute was subsequently repealed. Ch. 111, § 5, (1971] Idaho Sess. Laws.
19. 404 U.S. at 76.
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the Court's analysis: instead of focusing most of its inquiry upon the legisla-
tive purpose as it had done in the past,20 the Court examined the rational
relation of the means chosen, to the end to be achieved. It held the means
arbitrary, not rational, and therefore unconstitutional, but did so in a curt
opinion which obscured as much as it illuminated. The Court held that the
mandatory preference of males, for the sake of eliminating the necessity of a
hearing on the merits, W/as "the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"21
It is evident that Reed represents a stricter use of the traditional equal
protection analysis, one that emphasizes the efficacy of the means chosen to
achieve a valid legislative purpose.2 2 Establishing priorities in choosing estate
administrators based upon an arguably reasonable assumption that men have
more familiarity with financial matters than do women, would seem to further
the legitimate purpose of administrative convenience. Arguably the statute
was not arbitrary under the traditional rational basis analysis.2 3 The Court's
brief opinion gave no precise indication of the standard of analysis to be used
in subsequent sex discrimination cases.
In Frontiero v. Richardson,24 a plurality of the Court did say that sex was
an inherently suspect classification, subject to strict scrutiny. Two federal
statutes provided certain dependents' benefits for spouses of members of the
armed services. A serviceman could obtain these benefits for his wife without
any demonstration of her dependency upon him. A servicewoman, however,
could obtain these same benefits for her husband only upon the showing that
she contributed more than half of his support.25 The Court reversed a
three-judge district court's determination that the classification by sex was
rationally related to the purpose of administrative convenience served by the
20. See note 8 supra.
21. 404 U.S. at 76. The Court cited F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920) (classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of
difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.").
22. See note 9 supra.
23. Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 Duke
L.J. 163, 173.
24. 411 U.S. 677 (1973), noted in 87 Harv. L. Rev. 116 (1973). The opinion of Justice
Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas, White and Marshall. Justice Stewart filed a one
sentence concurring statement, agreeing that the statute worked "an invidious discrimination,"
citing Reed. 411 U.S. at 691. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun in a concurring opinion. Id.; see text accompanying notes 31-33 infra. Justice
Rehnquist dissented. Id. For an interpretation of the meaning of plurality decisions see Com-
ment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev.
99 (1956).
25. See 37 U.S.C. § 401(1), (3) (1970); 10 U.S.C. § 1072(2)(A), (D) (1970). Such benefits
include allowances for living quarters, 37 U.S.C. § 403 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II1, 1973), and
medical care, 10 U.S.C. § 1076(1970). Comparejablon v. Secretaryof HEW, 44 U.S.L.W. 2066 (D.
Md. Aug. 12, 1975) (three-judge district court).
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statute.26 Justice Brennan stated in the plurality opinion that "classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national
origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny. '27 Administrative convenience was not sufficiently compel-
ling to save the scheme. 28 Justice Brennan found "at least implicit support"29
in Reed for labeling sex-based classifications as inherently suspect, calling that
decision a "departure from 'traditional' rational-basis analysis."'30
Justice Powell concurred, finding the judgment to be "abundantly support-
[ed]" by Reed.31 He believed it unnecessary, however, for the Court to declare
sex a suspect classification. The process of ratification or rejection of the
Equal Rights Amendment 2 to the Constitution influenced Justice Powell. He
thought it unwise for the Court to "pre-empt" such a political decision, which
he believed would resolve the question. 33
Frontiero represents the Court's strongest denunciation of sex-based dis-
crimination. Justice Brennan's eloquent rejection of paternalistic discrimina-
tion was echoed in his later dissents in Kahn v. Shevin, 34 Geduldig v.
Aiello, 35 and Schlesinger v. Ballard.36 In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 3 7 how-
26. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201 (M.D. Ala. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
27. 411 U.S. at 688. Justice Brennan analogized sex discrimination to race discrimination,
stating that "throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, In
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves
nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married
women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as legal
guardians of their own children." Id. at 685.
28. Id. at 688-91.
29. Id. at 682.
30. Id. at 684.
31. Id. at 692 (concurring opinion).
32. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex." Proposed Amend. to the U.S. Const., S.J. Res. 8, S.J. Res. 9, &
H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). Some 34 of the required 38 states have at one time
ratified this amendment. Subsequently, however, at least one state has revoked its ratification.
Should the required total of 38 states be reached, the efficacy of this revocation will have to be
determined. For a variety of views on the necessity for, and the implications of, the Equal Rights
Amendment see Symposium, Men, Women, and the Constitution: The Equal Rights Amend-
ment, 10 Colum. J. of L. & Soc. Prob. 77 (1973); Equal Rights for Women: A Symposium on the
Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 6 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 215 (1971);
Symposium, The Equal Rights Amendment, I Human Rights 54 (1971).
33. 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). See Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 617, 640-42 (1974).
34. 416 U.S. 351, 357-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see notes 46-48 infra and
accompanying text.
35. 417 U.S. 484, 497-505 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 57 infra and accompany-
ing text.
36. 419 U.S. 498, 511-21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see notes 64-65 infra and
accompanying text.
37. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975); see notes 66-80 infra and accompanying text.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ever, he has retreated from his outspoken view that sex is a suspect classifica-
tion and grounded his opinion, joined by a majority of the Court, on a
"newer" equal protection analysis.3 8
An equal protection attack upon a sex-based statutory classification was
considered in Kahn v. Shevin,3 9 where a widower challenged a Florida law
that provided an annual $500 property tax exemption to widows.40 The Court
affirmed the state court's denial of a declaratory judgment al that the statute
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Writing for
a six-member majority, Justice Douglas abandoned the strict scrutiny test
which he had espoused in joining Justice Brennan's opinion in Frontiero.4 2
He looked to the purpose of the law and found that it was "to further the state
policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for
which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."''
3
Noting that in matters of taxation, "the States have large leeway in making
classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable
systems of taxation,""4 the Court did not subject the means to more than
cursory scrutiny. Instead it held that "Florida's differing treatment of widows
and widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' ,,as
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented vigorously, repeat-
ing his belief that a standard of strict judicial scrutiny must be applied to a
"legislative classification that distinguishes potential beneficiaries solely by
reference to their gender-based status .... "46 He believed the purpose
asserted by the majority-aiding women who had been victims of past
economic discrimination-was sufficiently compelling.' 7 The statute, how-
ever, failed to meet the strict scrutiny test because it was overinclusive, aiding
rich as well as poor widows, and underinclusive, aiding only those women
who had lost husbands through death. The law would survive Justice
Brennan's strict scrutiny only if narrowly drafted to aid women who were
actual victims of economic discrimination.' 8
The deviation in Kahn from the trend discerned in Reed and Frontiero of
overturning sex discrimination statutes, is perhaps explained by the fact that
38. See note 9 supra.
39. 416 U.S. 351 (1974), discussed in The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 129
(1974).
40. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 196.191(7) (1971), as amended, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 196.202 (Supp. 197S).
41. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973), affd, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
42. 411 U.S. 677 (1973); see notes 24-30 supra and accompan)ing text.
43. 416 U.S. at 355.
44. Id., quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973).
45. 416 U.S. at 355, quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (197 1), quoting F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
46. 416 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 359-60.
48. Id. at 360.
1975]
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the challenged statute had a benign effect upon a class traditionally the victim
of discrimination. 4 9 The Florida statute is an example of reverse discrimi-
nation, a subject with which the Court has not yet dealt directly.5 0 Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld5' now makes it clear, however, that the recital of a
benign purpose will not save such a statute from attack. The fact that the
action involved the state taxing power may be of significance. Kahn, rather
than being an indication of the Court retreating from its course of more
closely examining the means used to achieve the purpose of a statute, may
simply be a case in which the exceptional fact situation does not warrant
such an analysis.
After Kahn, the Court twice rejected equal protection attacks on statutes
that singled out women for special treatment. In Geduldig v. Aiello,5 2 the
Court upheld California's exclusion of disabilities related to normal preg-
nancies from its insurance program which provided income maintenance to
those persons unable to work because of disabilities.5 3 There was a question
here as to whether the exclusion of a disability that affected only women was
in fact sex-based and discriminatory. Justice Stewart's opinion for a six-
member majority5 4 said that it was not. Two classes were found to have been
set up, "pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first is ex-
clusively female, the second includes members of both sexes." s s Thus, there
was no sex discrimination. The exclusion of pregnancy related disabilities
served the legitimate state purpose of maintaining a self-supporting pro-
gram.5 6
In his dissent, Justice Brennan used the strict scrutiny analysis and found
that the "singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability
peculiar to women ... created a double standard for disability compensation:
a limitation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers may
recover, while men receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered,
including those that affect only or primarily their sex .... ,,57
Such a statute may be based upon the cultural assumptions that woman's
role is childbearing, and that her husband will provide her support during
this time. There is also a feeling that pregnancy is a voluntary condition,
49. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 133 & n.33.
50. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the
Supreme Court-1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 617, 663-64 (1974).
51. 95 S. Ct. 1225, 1233 (1975).
52. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
53. The lower court had held that exclusion of disabilities resulting from normal and
abnormal pregnancies violated equal protection. Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792, 801 (N.D.
Cal. 1973). Because California subsequently changed its law to provide coverage for abnormal
pregnancies, the Court held that question to be moot and limited its decision to normal
pregnancies. 417 U.S. at 492.
54. The decision was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist. Justice Brennan filed a dissent in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined.
55. 417 U.S. at 497 n.20.
56. Id. at 496-97.
57. Id. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 44
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somehow less deserving of consideration. In the case at issue, it is noteworthy
that California provided compensation for disabilities such as cosmetic plastic
surgery and sterilization, surely no less voluntary than pregnancy. The effect
that this "voluntariness" argument would have on the value of Aiello remains
unclear. s8
Another statute that purported to favor women was attacked as a violation
of equal protection in Schlesinger v. Ballard.s 9 The Navy allowed women line
officers a tenure of thirteen years before mandatory discharge for want of
promotion. 60 Male line officers, however, were discharged upon twice being
passed over for promotion, regardless of the length of their tenure. 61 The
plaintiff, a male, had served only nine years when he became subject to
mandatory discharge.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, examined the legislative history of
the statute in much the same way that Justice Brennan was to do two months
later in Wiesenfeld. He reasoned that restrictions on female line officers'
participation in combat and most sea duty gave them less of an opportunity to
compile the impressive service record needed for promotion. The congres-
sional intent was to provide these women with "equitable career advancement
programs. '62 This was a valid legislative goal, found to be furthered by the
means. The Court's determinaion that this was the purpose of the statute
was supported by the fact that in navy programs in which men and women
were similarly situated, such as staff officer programs, Congress made no
tenure distinctions. 63
Justice Brennan again dissented, repeating his belief formulated in Fron-
tiero that sex is a suspect classification. This was a position from which he
was soon to retreat in Wiesenfeld. The retreat was perhaps foreshadowed in
58. The Third Circuit, in a decision involving the denial of pregnancy benefits in a private
disability plan, has recently rejected voluntariness as a justification for different treatment of
pregnancy. The court pointed out that many activities such as "[d]rinking intoxicating beverages,
smoking, skiing, handball and tennis," are voluntary and involve the possibility of physical
harm, but this resulting harm is not excluded from disability coverage. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 95 S. CL 1989 (1975). The Court also
pointed out that the lack of 100% effectiveness of any contraceptive device, the possibility of health
complications in their use and the conflict between their use and certain religious convictions, all
militate against any presumption of voluntariness. Id. The Fourth Circuit has also recently held that
the denial of disability benefits for pregnancy is violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970). Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., No. 74-1557 (4th Cir. June 27, 1975).
These decisions distinguish Aiello by stating that although the denial of pregnancy benefits is not an
"involuntary discrimination" denying equal protection, itis a discrimination based on sex in violation
of the guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Communication Workers v. A.T. & T. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d
Cir. 1975), reversing and remanding 379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), which had said that such
discrimination did not violate Title VII.
59. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
60. 10 U.S.C. § 6401(a) (1970).
61. Id. § 6382(a) (1970).
62. 419 U.S. at 508.
63. Id. at 509.
1975]
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his following the majority's lead and examining legislative history, finding it
"replete with indications of a decision not to give women any special ad-
vantage." 64 He then pointed out the logical flaw in the majority's position,
which was that women line officers do not compete with men for promotion.
Their lack of combat and sea duty would thus in no way disadvantage
them.65
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 6 6 the Court also addressed a statute that
purported to favor women. Section 402(g) of the social security law67 provided
a "mother's benefit" upon the assumption that the death or disability of a
father resulted in a loss of earnings for the family. 68 The same assumption,
however, did not run in favor of the family of an employed mother, whose
compulsory contribution to the system resulted in less protection for her
family. If she died or became disabled, her husband received no benefits to
compensate for the loss of her salary or to provide for the homemaking and
childcare services she contributed.
In writing for the Court, 69 Justice Brennan seemed to have abandoned his
former insistence upon strict scrutiny of gender-based classifications, although
he cited Frontiero as the basis of the decision. His analysis of the statute
followed the model of a "newer equal protection" standard discerned by
commentators. 7
0
The opinion limits Kahn, stating that the "mere recitation of a benign,
compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any
inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme. 7 1
The purpose of the classification advanced by the government was the
compensation of women beneficiaries for the economic difficulties they faced
in seeking to support themselves and their families. 72 The Court refused to
accept this purpose without question. Instead, it investigated the legislative
history73 and found that the aim of section 402(g) was "to provide children
64. Id. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
67. See note 3 supra for the pertinent portion of the text of the statute.
68. See 95 S. Ct. at 1231 n.13; P. Booth, Social Security in America 30 & n.5 (1973).
69. Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the opinion of the Court.
Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger joined. Justice
Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the result. Justice Douglas took no part.
70. See note 9 supra. This test has been termed "strict rationality." The Supreme Court, 1972
Term, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 123 (1973).
71. 95 S. Ct. at 1233. The Court also noted that the statute involved in Frontiero gave the
servicewoman the opportunity to prove her husband's dependency. The social security statute,
however, was "more pernicious," establishing an irrebutable presumption against the widower.
See Note, The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1534
(1974).
72. 95 S. Ct. at 1233.
73. "This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of
legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates
that the asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." Id. at 1233 n.16.
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deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the personal attention of the
other." 74 Looking at the relation of the statute to that purpose, the Court
found the gender-based distinction "entirely irrational" because the "classifica-
tion discriminates among surviving children solely on the basis of the sex of
the surviving parent," a result which "makes no sense."1
7 5
The Court also said that the gender-based distinction was gratuitous. 6 The
benefits granted to women under section 402(g) were inversely proportional to
their earnings. If indeed the stereotype of men as breadwinners is valid, then
few men would receive section 402(g) benefits. Only those men in need, that
is, only those similarly situated to the women the law already aids, would
receive the benefits. 7
7
The Court concluded that the sex-based classification could not be said to
have provided for the special needs of women. As such, the classification
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment.78
The decision is important in that this law had more far-reaching effects on
American society than the laws overturned in Reed and Frontiero.7 9 It is
probable that the Court, in former days, would have found any number of
valid legislative purposes adequately served by section 402(g).80 The Court
has not, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, declared by a majority that sex is a
suspect classification. It has, however, shown itself willing and able to
invalidate certain types of sex discrimination by applying the traditional equal
protection rational basis standard with a greater degree of vigor than in the
past.
Rosemary T. Levine
Criminal Law-Narcotics--District of Columbia Circuit Holds Severe
Penalty Provision of the Controlled Substances Act Inapplicable to
Registered Physician.-Doctor Thomas W. Moore, a licensed physician
registered under the Controlled Substances Act' to prescribe and dispense
methadone (a schedule II controlled substance2 ) for detoxification purposes,
74. Id. at 1233. The Court, citing the Final Report of the Advisory Council on Social Security
31 (1938), found that purpose explicitly stated to be "enabling the widow to remain at home and
care for the children." Id. at 1233-34.
75. Id. at 1235. The Court also noted the father's right to the custody of his child, Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), with which section 402(g) interfered. 95 S. Ct. at 1235.
76. 95 S. CL at 1236.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. It is estimated that it will cost the government $20 million to provide the benefits for men
as well as for women. N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1975, § 4, at 16, col. 1.
80. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1079-81 and cases
cited in n.16 (1969).
1. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, §§ 101-709, 84 Stat. 1242).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (Schedule II(b)(11)) (1970); see note 43 infra.
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was tried and convicted3 in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia on twenty-two counts for the knowing and unlawful distribution
and dispensation of that narcotic drug-a violation of the primary felony
provision, section 841, 4 of the Act. The conditions at Dr. Moore's office and
his manner of prescribing drugs violated legitimate professional standards.
The doctor employed armed guards and kept a handgun on his desk. Upon a
patient's arrival, a nurse administered a cursory examination and requested an
unsupervised urine specimen. When the patient finally saw Dr. Moore and
asked for a methadone prescription, the doctor informed him that the cost of
a prescription was proportionate to the number of pills requested. Dr. Moore
generally did not inquire about the dosage that his patients were consuming
nor did he give instructions as to the use of the pills. Moreover, Dr. Moore
still would prescribe the pills to patients even though a urinalysis showed
no use of narcotics. Many witnesses testified that they could get a "cheap
high" through Dr. Moore because the cost of these prescriptions was cheaper
than the price of heroin on the street.5
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, though assuming the doctor "acted wrongfully,"'6 held section 841 in-
applicable to a registered physician, 7 reversed the conviction,8 and declined to
discuss whether he "could lawfully administer a methadone maintenance
3. United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426, 445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 924
(1975) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). The sentences were concurrent prison terms of five to fifteen
years on fourteen of the counts and ten to thirtyyears on the remaining, to run concurrently with each
other but consecutively to the first sentence. The court also imposed fines totalling $150,000 and
revoked his license to practice medicine pursuant to D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 2-131 (1966). Id.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970). The section provides in pertinent part: "Except as authorized by
this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(I) to . ..
distribute, or dispense . .. a controlled substance .. - ." Id. at (a)(1).
The penalties for violation of this section provide in part: "Except as otherwise provided in
section 845 of this title, any person who violates subsection (a) ... shall be sentenced as follows:
"In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II .... such person shall be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of not more than 15 years, a fine of not more than $25,000, or both." Id.
at (b)(1)(A).
5. United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, J., dissent-
ing), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 1116 (1975).
6. Id. at 429.
7. Id. at 427. Contra, United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 200 (9th Cir. 1975), petition
for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3603 (U.S. May 13, 1975) (No. 74-1367); United States v. Green, 511
F.2d 1062, 1067(7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. March 29, 1975) (No.
74-1233). The importance of this issue should not be underestimated for many states tend to model
their drug legislation after the federal laws in order to effectuate efficient control of narcotics. More
than thirty states have passed the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, or a variation thereof. See,
e.g., fll. Ann. Stat. ch. 56, §§ 1100-1603 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 94c, §§ 1-48
(1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 453.011-.361 (1973); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 54-11-1 to 54-11-39(Supp. 1973);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 69.50.101-608 (Supp. 1974). Although New York did not pass the act, its
law does take into account the federal law. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00 -. 60 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
8. 505 F.2d at 427.
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program." 9 United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 420 U.S. 924 (1975).
Congress first attempted to control drugs and drug traffic with the enact-
ment of the Harrison Act I0 in 1914. Originally designed as a tax measure, its
primary purpose was to bring "the domestic traffic in narcotics into the open
under a licensing system, so that the sloppy dispensing practices of the day
could be checked."" Thus, the Act was not intended to interfere with the
medical treatment of drug addicts. An explicit statutory exemption was
provided for the reputable physician prescribing and dispensing narcotics in
his good faith professional practice. 12
9. Id. at 429. There are generally two systems used in treating addicts with methadone--
maintenance and detoxification. Under a proper maintenance approach, methadone is adminis-
tered in daily doses of ten to twenty mg. with increases until stabilization is achieved, resulting in
a condition of "blockade." This "blockade" prevents heroin from entering into the receptors in the
human body because they are filled with methadone. As a result, an addict will not experience
any euphoria if other narcotic drugs are ingested. The process is administered under supervision
in a clinic in order to prevent the drug from getting into the community, for methadone, itself, is a
narcotic.
Detoxification, a less controversial approach, involves a process whereby a patient receives
increasing doses of methadone until the dosage necessary to prevent withdrawal symptoms is
found. Once this level has been reached the patient's dosage is decreased gradually until he is
detoxified and can abstain from drugs.
A person seeking such assistance must receive a thorough physical examination. See DeLong,
Treatment and Rehabilitation, in Dealing with Drug Abuse 173 (1972); Cazalas & Bucaro,
Methadone Maintenance Blockade Treatment: A Solution for Addiction, 16 Loyola L. Rev. 1,
5-6 (1970); Note, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin Addicts, 78 Yale L.J. 1175, 1175-91 (1969).
See also Whitford, The Physician, the Law, and the Drug Abuser, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933,
954-58 (1971).
Speaking of the procedure employed by Dr. Moore in his methadone maintenance and
detoxification program, the dissent stated: "[T]he ...evidence conclusively demonstrates that
[his]. . .treatment was not 'consistent with any method.., throughout the United States that is
accepted by the medical profession in this country.'... [His] fee arrangement of increasing prices
for a prescription based solely on the number of dolophines prescribed . ..[is] 'not only not
acceptable medical practice . . . [hut] is unethical medical practice.' " 505 F.2d at 447-48
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
10. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 StaL 785 (repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. I, § I101(b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1292).
11. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62
Yale L.J. 736, 737 (1953). See generally Comment, Control of Amphetamine Prescription and
Production: Critical Analysis of Federal, State and Local Efforts to Control Amphetamine Abuse,
8 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 401, 410-11 (1972); Note, Methadone Maintenance for Heroin
Addicts, 78 Yale L.J. 1175, 1195 (1969).
12. " ']t shall be unlawful for any person to sell... the aforesaid drugs except in pursuance
of a written order ... on a form to be issued ... by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue....
Nothing contained in this section shall apply--(a) To the dispensing or distribution of any of the
aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician ... registered under this Act in the course of his
professional practice only: Provided, That such physician ... shall keep a record of all such
drugs dispensed or distributed, showing the amount dispensed or distributed ... except such as
may be dispensed or distributed to a patient upon whom such physician ... shall personally
attend .... ' " Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 786.
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Early cases decided under the Harrison Act, however, assumed that the
physicians were not prescribing narcotics to cure drug addiction, but were
administering the drugs merely to satisfy the cravings of an addict.13 The
quantity prescribed 14 and the superficial examinations given 5 generally
were considered sufficient evidence of bad faith and thus disqualified physi-
cians from the exemption.' 6 Doctors were treated as pushers and convicted of
violating the Act. 17
A different situation arose in United States v. Behrman. 18 The indictment
charged that Dr. Behrman gave a derivative of opium to one who did not
require the drug "by reason of any disease other than such addiction .... 9
No charge was made that the doctor was not acting in good faith to cure the
addiction. On the basis of quantity alone, 20 the Court found that the doctor
had violated the Act, thereby extending the rationale of the former cases
beyond what some Justices believed to be the intent of the Act.2 1
These decisions left physicians in a precarious position for it seemed that
13. See, e.g., Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189, 193 (1920), overruled on other
grounds, Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933); Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 98
(1919); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 90 (1919).
14. jin Fuey Moy v.-United States, 254 U.S. 189, 193 (1920), overruled on other grounds,
Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933) (prescriptions calling for large quantities of
morphine); Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 98 (1919) (doctor furnishing over 4,000
prescriptions).
15. 254 U.S. at 193.
16. "Manifestly the phrases 'to a patient' and 'in the course of his professional practice only'
are intended to confine the immunity of a registered physician. . . strictly within the appropriate
bounds of a physician's professional practice, and not to extend it to include a sale to a dealer...
to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug. A
'prescription' issued for either of the latter purposes protects neither the physician who issues It
nor the dealer who knowingly accepts and fills it." Id. at 194.
17. In Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), the Sixth Circuit had certified to the
Supreme Court the question:
" 'If a practicing and registered physician issues an order for morphine to an habitual user
thereof, the order not being issued by him in the course of professional treatment in the attempted
cure of the habit, but being issued for the purpose of providing the user with morphine sufficient
to keep him comfortable by maintaining his customary use, is such order a physician's prescrip-
tion under exception (b) of § 2?' " Id. at 99.
The Court decided: "[To call such an order for the use of morphine a physician's prescription
would be so plain a perversion of meaning that no discussion . . . is required." Id. at 99-100.
18. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
19. Id. at 286.
20. Over three thousand doses were dispensed. Id. at 289.
21. "The defendant was a licensed physician and his part in the sale was the giving of
prescriptions for the drugs .... [I]t must be assumed that he gave them in the regular course of
his practice and in good faith.
"... It seems to me impossible to construe the statute as tacitly making such acts, however
foolish, crimes, by saying that what is in form a prescription and is given honestly in the course of
a doctor's practice, . . . is not within the words, is not a prescription and is not given in the
course of practice, if the Court deems the doctor's faith in his patient manifestly unwarranted."
Id. at 290 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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"[a]ny doctor who prescribed any narcotic to any addict could be threatened
with prosecution . . . and good faith was no defense." 22 As a result, the
medical profession refused to treat addicts and the United States acquired the
reputation as the best market for illicit narcotics. 2 3
This intolerable situation could not last indefinitely. The Supreme Court, in
Linder v. United States,24 attempted to clarify the rights of physicians to
prescribe and dispense drugs in a manner which would not violate the federal
law. In an indictment almost identical to that in Behrmnan,2 5 the doctor was
charged with violating the Act. This time, however, the amount prescribed
was one tablet of morphine and three tablets of cocaine.2 6 The indictment did
not question the doctor's good faith medical purpose nor the propriety of his
actions in accordance with proper standards of medical practice.2 7 It merely
asserted that the act of dispensing the drugs to a known addict, even a minute
quantity, was sufficient to constitute an offense.28 The Court reversed the
doctor's conviction holding that the Harrison Act did not legislate the method
for treating addicts, especially where a physician prescribes a small quantity
of drugs29 and does so in good faith. The Court thereby repudiated the earlier
test3" and referring to the Behrman case said: "This opinion related to
definitely alleged facts and must be so understood. The enormous quantity of
drugs ordered . . . seemed enough . . . to exclude the idea of bona fide
professional action in the ordinary course." 3 1 Thus, Linder implies that a
physician must meet a dual test in order to qualify for the Harrison Act
exemption-good faith medical purpose and accordance with generally ac-
cepted medical standards. 32
22. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick, 62
Yale L.J. 736, 744 (1953); see, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 300 F. 321 (6th Cir. 1924)
(physician's giving 4,095 prescriptions calling for 79,592 grains of morphine within 9 months
creates conclusive presumption of bad faith); Hobart v. United States, 299 F. 784 (6th Cir. 1924)
(per curiam) (doctor's prescribing of large quantities of morphine at frequent intervals eliminated
good faith defense); Manning v. United States, 287 F. 800 (8th Cir. 1923) (physician's good faith
question for jury).
23. See King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and the Sick,
62 Yale L.J. 736, 744-45 (1953).
24. 268 U.S. 5 (1925).
25. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
26. 268 U.S. at 16.
27. Id. at 17.
28. Id. at 16-17.
29. "[The Act says nothing of 'addicts' and does not undertake to prescribe methods for their
medical treatment. They are diseased and proper subjects for such treatment, and we cannot
possibly conclude that a physician acted improperly or unwisely or for other than medical
purposes solely because he has dispensed to one of them, in the ordinary course and in good faith,
four small tablets of morphine or cocaine for relief of conditions incident to addiction. What
constitutes bona fide medical practice must be determined upon consideration of evidence and
attending circumstances." Id. at 18.
30. See notes 14-17 supra and accompanying text.
31. 268 U.S. at 22.
32. For a discussion and criticism of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Harrison Act
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Circuit courts, however, experienced great difficulty in applying the
guidelines of the Supreme Court and it became virtually impossible to
distinguish which tests the courts were using. Frequently, the mere prescrip-
tion of drugs to addicts resulted in indictments of doctors on the basis of the
fact that they were maintaining rather than curing addiction and therefore
lacked the good faith necessary for the Harrison Act exemption. 33 Legislation
was therefore necessary to alleviate the confusion caused by the conflicting
judicial interpretations. 34
Aware of the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States,3 5
Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 197036 in order to, inter alia, "strengthen existing law enforcement authority
in the field of drug abuse. . . ,,37 Title II of the Controlled Substances Act 8 has
as its primary purpose the enforcement of the Act.
The Act requires annual registration of every person in the legitimate chain
of drug distribution. 39 The Attorney General is directed to register an
applicant to distribute a controlled substance unless he determines that such
registration would be inconsistent with the public safety. 4 If a practitioner
already is authorized to dispense controlled substances under the law of the
State in which he practices, then such registration is pro forma. 4' Those
vis-k-vis physicians, see King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers
and the Sick, 62 Yale L.J. 736, 739-48 (1953).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Bloom, 164 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 857
(1948); United States v. Brandenburg, 155 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 769
(1947); United States v. Abdallah, 149 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 724 (1945);
Boehm v. United States, 21 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1927). See Note, Methadone Maintenance for
Heroin Addicts, 78 Yale L.J. 1175, 1202-03 n.112 (1969) for an analysis of circuit courts' criteria.
See also White v. United States, 399 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1968); Brown v. United States, 250 F.2d
745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
34. The confusion surrounding a physician's liability for treating narcotic addicts led the
Prettyman Commission to report- "Since the passage of the Harrison Act of 1914, the Federal
narcotics laws have expressly permitted a physician to prescribe narcotic drugs for a patient in
the course of 'professional practice only' and for 'legitimate medical uses' and 'legitimate medical
purposes.' Under this statutory language there is no doubt that a physician may prescribe narcotic
drugs for a patient suffering acute pain or from a painful and incurable disease. But a
controversy has existed for 50 years over the extent to which narcotic drugs may be administered
to an addict solely because he is an addict.
"The practicing physician has thus been confused as to when he may prescribe narcotic drugs
for an addict. Out of a fear of prosecution many physicians refuse to use narcotics in the
treatment of addicts except occasionally in a withdrawal regimen lasting no longer than a few
weeks. In most instances they shun addicts as patients." H.R. Rep. No. 1444 (Pt. 1), 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 14-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Report].
35. One indication of the upsurge in drug abuse was that from 1960 to 1968, arrests for drug
violations increased by 322 percent. House Report, supra note 34, at 6.
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
37. House Report, supra note 34, at 1.
38. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1970).
39. Id. § 822(a).
40. Id. § 823(b).
41. Id. § 823(0.
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persons registered are required to keep detailed records42 with all drugs
subject to control divided into five schedules, according to their potential for
abuse and actual medical value. 43 Furthermore, the Act provides severe
criminal penalties for engaging in illicit traffic, 44 especially in activities which
constitute a continuing criminal enterprise45 or distribution to a minor.46
Properly registered physicians are permitted to distribute, dispense and ,
prescribe certain controlled substances and those who violate registration
restrictions are subject to less severe penalty provisions.4 7 The overall scheme
of the criminal sanctions imposed for violation of the Act reflects a sentencing
procedure that is intended to give maximum flexibility to judges, enabling
them to consider the attendant circumstances of each individual case-that is,
to differentiate the casual violator from the hardened criminal.4 8 In essence,
the Act aims at deterring the trafficker, and not the abuser. 49
Finally, the Attorney General is authorized to promulgate rules and regu-
lations with respect to the distribution and dispensing of controlled sub-
stances.
5 0
After implementation of the Controlled Substances Act, circuit courts had
42. Id. § 827. "The bill is designed to improve the administration and regulation of the
manufacturing, distribution, and dispensing of controlled substances by providing for a 'closed'
system of drug distribution for legitimate handlers of such drugs. Such a closed system should
significantly reduce the widespread diversion of these drugs out of legitimate channels into the
illicit market, while at the same time providing the legitimate drug industry with a unified
approach to narcotic and dangerous drug control." House Report, supra note 34, at 6.
43. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b) (1970). See generally McLaughlin, A Nation Tranquilized-A
Socio-Legal Analysis of the Abuse of Sedatives in the United States, 42 Fordharn L. Rev. 725,
753-54 (1974); Comment, Control of Amphetamine Prescription and Production: Critical Anal)sis
of Federal, State and Local Efforts to Control Amphetamine Abuse, 8 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob.
401, 413-14 (1972).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1970); see note 3 supra.
45. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1970).
46. Id. § 845.
47. Id. §§ 842, 843 (1970). Section 842(a) provides in pertinent part: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person-(1) who is subject to the requirements . . . to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation of section 829 of this title .... " The penalty for violation is
provided in § 842(c): "[A]ny person who violates this section shall, with respect to any such
violation, be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 ...
"If a violation of this section is prosecuted by an information or indictment which alleges that
the violation was committed knowingly and the trier of fact specifically finds that the violation
was so committed, such person shall... be sentenced to imprisonment of not more than one year
or a fine of not more than $25,000, or both."
Section 843(a) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-(1) who
is a registrant to distribute a controlled substance classified in schedule I or 1, in the course of his
legitimate business, except pursuant to an order or an order form as required by section 828 of
this title .... " The penalty for violation is provided in § 843(c): "Any person who violates this
section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 4 years, a fine of not more
than $30,000, or both . . ."
48. House Report, supra note 34, at 11.
49. Compare 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-43 (1970) (penalties for dispensing narcotics), with § 844 (1970)
(penalties for possessing narcotics).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 821 (1970). See generally Whitford, The Physician, the Law, and the Drug
Abuser, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 933, 951-54 (1971).
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little difficulty in affirming convictions of physicians indicted under section
84151 when they issued prescriptions which could not be viewed as a
legitimate part of medical practice. 52 Some doctors were dispensing drugs
without giving physical examinations5 3 and even advising patients to get the
prescriptions filled at different pharmacies to avoid the spot checks made by
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.5 4 Such abuse led one court to
conclude:
[A] licensed practitioner is not immune from the act solely due to his status .... but
rather, because he is expected to prescribe or dispense drugs within the bounds of his
professional practice of medicine. A physician is restricted to dispensing or prescribing
drugs in the bona fide treatment of a patient's disease, including a dispensing of a
moderate amount of drugs to a known addict in a good-faith attempt to treat the
addiction or to relieve conditions or suffering incident to addiction. . . .However,
under the guise of treatment a physician cannot sell drugs to a dealer nor distribute
drugs intended to cater to cravings of an addict. . . .Congress did not intend for
doctors to become drug "pushers."
55
51. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970); see note 3 supra.
52. See United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United States v.
Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484 (10th Cir.
1973); United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973).
In United States v. Leigh, 487 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1973), the court affirmed the dismissal of an
indictment because it charged the physician with distributing rather than dispensing. However, It
did permit the return of a proper indictment if one was considered justified. 487 F.2d at 208. This
interpretation seemingly conflicts with a prior Fifth Circuit decision, United States v. Collier, 478
F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973), where the court affirmed a physician's plea of guilty to unlawfully
"distributing" controlled substances in violation of section 841.
The First Circuit, on the other hand, has held explicitly that a registered physician may be
charged only with "distributing" since, in its view, the statute defines "dispensing" as a lawful act
when done by a person registered under the statute. Noting that its interpretation conflicted with
the recent decision of the Fifth Circuit in Leigh, the court stated: "We think the reason Congress
included the term 'dispense' in § 841(a)(1) was to compel physicians to become properly
licensed. If not licensed, a physician could then be convicted of unlawful dispensing. However,
once licensed, he could not be convicted of unlawful dispensing because, as we stated above, the
statute defines the term in and of itself as a lawful act." United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296,
298 n.4 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
53. 490 F.2d at 297-98.
54. United States v. Bartee, 479 F.2d 484, 486 (10th Cir. 1973); accord, United States v.
Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). "Many of the factors considered significant in
Bartee are present here. (1) Larson did prescribe and/or distribute inordinate quantities to the
individuals named in the various counts. (2) He wrote more than one prescription on occasions in
order to 'spread' them out. (3) He charged a flat rate cash fee for each prescription, (4) Dr. Larson
cautioned the witness. . . about having the prescription filled at the same pharmacy because each
prescription was for a thirty day supply and he was supplying [the witness] with prescriptions
more frequently than that .... (5) Dr. Larson also used the street parlance for seconal: 'reds'; and
for methamphetamine: 'speed'...." Id. at 387-88 (citations omitted).
55. United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268, 271-72 (5th Cir. 1973); accord, United States v.
Bartee, 479 F.2d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1973). Both courts relied primarily upon the standards as
announced in the cases arising under the Harrison Act. See notes 10-34 supra and accompanying
text. See also United States v. Warren, 453 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
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This language became the standard for judging what would be considered
in the usual course of a physician's professional practice and was adopted
throughout the circuits. 56 Therefore, although physicians are permitted to
dispense narcotic drugs under the Act, the statutory definitions of "dis-
pense"5 7 and "practitioner"58 were limited to delivery of controlled substances
only in the course of professional practice and once a physician acted
otherwise, he was subject to section 841 sanctions. 59
It is interesting to note that the cases affirmed convictions under the
primary felony provision 60 of the Controlled Substances Act, without discussion
of possible immunity of physicians from section 841.6 1 No courts considered
sections 842 and 84362 to be the only provisions of the act applicable to
registered doctors. This inadequate statutory construction led the District of
Columbia Circuit Court in United States v. Moore63 to reverse the doctor's
conviction under section 841.64
In holding the severe penalty provision of the Controlled Substances Act
inapplicable to a registered physician, the court reached its conclusion
by force of the established principle that "when [a] choice has to be made between two
readings of what conduct Congress had made a crime, it is appropriate, before we
choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in
language that is clear and definite." 65
The majority, in its opinion, found that the legislative history of the Act
mitigated against the idea that the severe penalty provision should be applied
to a registrant because section 822(b)66 permits such registrants to dispense
56. See note 52 supra.
57. 21 TJ.S.C. § 802(10) (1970) reads: "The term 'dispense' means to deliver a controlled
substance to an ultimate user . . . by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practioner [sic),
including the prescribing and administering of a controlled substance... for such delivery. The
term 'dispenser' means a practitioner who so delivers a controlled substance to an ultimate user
58. Id. § 802(20) (1970) reads: "The term 'practitioner' means a physician . . . licensed,
registered, or otherwise permitted... to distribute [or] dispense... a controlled substance in the
course of professional practice .... "
59. United States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296, 298-99 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970); see note 3 supra.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 507 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); United
States v. Badia, 490 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
62. 21 U.S.C. §§ 842, 843 (1970); see note 47 supra.
63. United States v. Moore, 505 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 524
(1975).
64. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1970); see note 3 supra.
65. 505 F.2d at 427, quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218,
221-22 (1952). The court did state, however, that it could not choose the less harsh alternative if
the statutory purpose of the Act was evident. Id. See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26
(1948).
66. 21 U.S.C. § 822(b) (1970) provides: "Persons registered by the Attorney General under
this subchapter to . . . distribute, or dispense controlled substances are authorized to . . .
distribute, or dispense such substances ... to the extent authorized by their registration and in
conformity with the other provisions of this subchapter."
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controlled substances and the "language echoes the 'except as authorized'
language of § 841, suggesting immunity for registrants from the [severe] penal
sanctions .... "67 Furthermore, the bill passed by the Senate68 did not
contain a section comparable to section 822(b). The House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce added it 69 in order "to make it clear that
persons registered under this title are authorized to deal in . . . controlled
substances. '70 According to the court, this statement indicates that the severe
penalty provision does not apply to such registrants. 71
The court buttressed its analysis by noting the overall position of section
841 in the scheme of the Act. Violations of sections 82872 and 829, 73 requiring
proper forms and prescriptions for the distribution or prescription of drugs,
are backed up by the penalties provided in sections 842 and 843.74 These
sections specifically mention "registrants" whereas section 841 does not.
Therefore, this suggests that Congress intended to deal with registrants
through administrative controls-sections 842 and 843-reserving the severe
penalty provision for those who seek to avoid regulation by not registering.75
What the majority found most convincing, however, was the fact that the
Controlled Substances Act contained three separate penalty provisions7 6 in
contrast to the single penalty provision of the Harrison Act.77 The provisions,
originally considered by the Senate,78 separated the penalty sections so that
the severe one would apply to traffickers7 9 and the others to those in the
legitimate drug trade.8 0 Therefore, once a physician has been registered, the
67. 505 F.2d at 429. The court did admit that the language could suggest that "Congress did
not intend authorization for registrants to extend beyond compliance with the other provisions of
the Act and the regulations promulgated .... " However, it discounted this interpretation. Id.
68. S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reproduced at 116 Cong. Rec, 1671 (1970).
69. House Report, supra note 34, at 38.
70. Id. The standards and procedures for revoking an individual's registration have re-
cently been strengthened by the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L, No. 93-281,
§§ 3, 4, 88 Stat. 124, amending 21 U.S.C. §§ 823, 824 (1970) (codified as 21 U.S.C.A. 99 823(g),
824(a,d) (1974)).
Section 823(g) provides: "Practitioners who dispense narcotic drugs to individuals for mainte-
nance treatment or detoxification treatment shall obtain annually a separate registration for that
purpose."
Section 824(a) provides: "A registration pursuant to section 823(g) of this title to dispense a
narcotic drug for maintenance treatment or detoxification treatment may be suspended or
revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant has failed to comply with any
standard referred to in section 823(g) of this title."
71. 505 F.2d at 430.
72. 21 U.S.C. § 828 (1970).
73. Id. § 829.
74. See note 47 supra.
75. 505 F.2d at 430.
76. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-43 (1970); see notes 3, 47 supra.
77. 505 F.2d at 431. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
78. S. 3246, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reproduced at 116 Cong. Rec. 1671 (1970). The
relevant portions are §§ 501-03 and are now embodied in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-43 (1970).
79. S. Rep. No. 613, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
80. Id. at 9. See 505 F.2d at 432-33.
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only provisions applicable to him for any violation are the modest penalty
provisions of sections 842 and 843 which enforce a system of administrative
controls.81
In a vehement dissent,8 2 Judge MacKinnon questioned: "What sanction
then, does the law impose on this drug pusher masquerading in the honorable
profession of medicine?"8 3 To him, since the Act is replete with provisions
that a registered physician must act in accordance with accepted medical
practice, 84 the "except as authorized" proviso in section 841 must be con-
strued to mean that when "the conduct of a registrant violates this authorized
standard [viz., dispensation of controlled substances in accordance with
accepted medical practice] he excludes his acts from the exception of section
[841] and makes himself subject to its penalties"8 5 because he then falls into
the category of any person8 6 and enjoys no such immunity.8 7 The lesser
penalty provisions of sections 842 and 843 are only intended to cover "[more] or
less technical violations" s88 of procedural requirements and not the substantive
81. 505 F.2d at 430. With respect to prior decisions discussed in notes 52-61 supra and
accompanying text, the court said: "[Those courts] . .. never considered the effect of § 822,
providing for the registration of dispensing physicians ... . As we respond to a line of reasoning
which was not explored in any of these cases, we do not consider them persuasive authority." 505
F.2d at 434 n.44.
82. Id. at 44-45 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). "The majority today reverses the conviction of
a medical doctor, clearly proven to be a drug pusher (trafficker), on the ground that he was
prosecuted under the wrong section of the Controlled Substances Act. They reach this result
despite the fact that the section is aimed at drug pushers and 'traffickers,' which Dr. Moore
clearly was. The majority holds that the authorization of a doctor to dispense controlled
substances for legitimate medical purposes absolutely immunizes him from prosecution under
section ... 841 ... even when he dispenses narcotic drugs clearly for illegitimate purposes. The
majority thus holds that Congress intended to exempt trafficking doctors, merely because they
were doctors, from the penalities applicable to other traffickers. The fatal defect in this holding is the
failure to recognize that the provision of section [841] which excepts authorized conduct does not
create a special class of persons immune from prosecution for trafficking; rather, it recognizes the
legality of the acts and conduct of a physician when he dispenses a narcotic drug in good faith for
a legitimate medical purpose consistent with the terms of his registration under the Act." Id.
83. Id. at 448 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
84. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 802(20) (1970) (" 'practitioner' means a physician... registered...
to ...dispense. . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice .... ); Id.
§ 827(c)(1)(A) (excepting registrants from the requirement of making certain records and reports
with respect to schedule 11, I1, IV, or V narcotics prescribed or administered "by a practitioner
in the lawful course of his professional practice"); id. § 828(e) ("unlawful for any person to obtain
... controlled substances for any purpose other than their. .. dispensing.. . in the course of his
professional practice . . . "). See also 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (1974) ("[a] prescription for a
controlled substance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an
individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice").
85. 505 F.2d at 451-52 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1970) provides: "[lit shall be unlawful for any person ... (1) to...
distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance . . ... "; see note 3 supra.
87. 505 F.2d at 450 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
88. House Report, supra note 34, at 10.
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conduct of a registrant.8 9 "In short, . . . the [appropriate] penalty [was made
to] fit the crime" 90 and Dr. Moore was nothing more than "a drug pusher, a
trafficker in illegal narcotics." 91
Subsequent to the Moore decision, other circuits consistently have upheld
the conviction of registered physicians under the severe penalty provision of
the Controlled Substances Act, thereby expressly repudiating the Moore
rationale. 92 These courts have been concerned with the anomaly that would
result if physicians were immunized completely from prosecution under
section 841. Since registration for the most part is pro forma, 93 the physician
would be able to "stand on [any] street corner and sell prescriptions to
passersby"94 with impunity because he would not be writing prescriptions but
personally delivering controlled substances. This difference lies in the fact
that sections 842 and 843 are triggered by a violation of section 829 which
requires a written prescription "[e]xcept when dispensed directly by a prac-
titioner ... to an ultimate user .... -95 Thus no prescription would mean no
violation and if registrants were not subject to section 841, they would be
immune from federal prosecution. 96 "To leave the federal government power-
less to act against such persons would be to 'override common sense' .... 197
The courts also have been reluctant to reject the precedent established by
the Harrison Act as the Moore majority did.98 Though the form of the statute
has changed, the substance has remained99 and physicians, acting without a
legitimate medical purpose by allowing the bearers of their prescriptions to
obtain controlled substances "should be treated like . . . any streetcorner
pill-pusher." 100 Thus, once a doctor acts beyond the course of professional
practice, he is no longer considered a practitioner' 0' under the Act and not
89. 505 F.2d at 453 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 455 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 448 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). Even the Senate has recognized this situation as it
noted during consideration of the Narcotic Addict Treatment Act of 1974, note 70 supra. See S.
Rep. No. 192, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
92. See United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 195-96 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert.
filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3603 (U.S. May 13, 1975) (No. 74-1367); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d
1062, 1067-69 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. March 29, 1975)
(No. 74-1233); cf. United States v. Carroll, No. 74-1938 (6th Cir., June 12, 1975); United States v.
Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975).
93. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
94. United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 194 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3603 (U.S. May 13, 1975) (No. 74-1367).
95. 21 U.S.C. § 829 (1970).
96. 515 F.2d at 195.
97. Id. at 194.
98. See notes 76-81 supra and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed,
43 U.S.L.W. 3603 (U.S. May 13, 1975) (No. 74-1367); United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062,
1068-69 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. March 29, 1975) (No.
74-1233).
100. United States v. Green, 511 F.2d 1062, 1067 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S. March 29, 1975) (No. 74-1233).
101. See note 58 supra.
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authorized to prescribe controlled substances.10 2 To hold otherwise would be
in derogation of congressional intent for:
The congressional purpose behind section 841 was to get the drug dealer no matter
who he might be, and to prevent diversion of legitimately produced controlled
substances into illicit channels. One of the major sources of this illicit diversion is from
registrants who have relatively easy access to controlled substances. Certainly Con-
gress did not intend to immunize such individuals from prosecution under section
841.103
Undoubtedly the consequences of a conviction under section 841 of the
Controlled Substances Act are extremely severe. ' 0 4 However, a vast quantity
of narcotics which are produced legitimately and intended to be used for
proper medical treatment finds its way into illicit channels. 05 The doctor,
himself, is sought out by the drug companies because "he is in a unique
economic position; he tells the consumer what to buy."' 0 6 It is extremely easy
for an unscrupulous physician in this position, armed with his medical degree
and prescription pad, to sell narcotics for profit. The Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act militates against such an idea because
Congress sought to attack the illegal traffic in drugs "with the full power of
the Federal Government. The price for participation in this traffic should be
prohibitive. It should be made too dangerous to be attractive."' 0 7 The only
completely effective way to achieve this goal is to render any person,
regardless of status, who deals in such illicit traffic subject to the felony
provision of the Controlled Substances Act.
John T. Aragona
Labor Law-Supreme Court Holds That Labor Unions Are Not
Exempt from Antitrust Statutes.-Local 100, the respondent union, rep-
resented plumbers and mechanical tradesmen of the Dallas area for collective
bargaining purposes. It entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
Mechanical Contractors Association of Dallas, a multi-employer bargaining unit
102. 515 F.2d at 193.
103. 511 F.2d at 1069 (emphasis added).
104. Besides the heavy fine and imprisonment imposed by the section, see note 3 supra, a
physician may also have his license to practice medicine revoked. See, e.g., D.C. Code Encycl.
Ann. § 2-131 (1966) (conviction of a felony in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia may result in revocation of a physician's license without further hearing or procedure);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 91, § 16a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) (conviction of a felony in state of federal
court may result in a revocation of a license to practice medicine).
105. See House Report, supra note 34, at 7; J. Martin, T. Quinn & J. McCahey, .Methadone
Diversion, A Study in Five Cities 1-37 (1974); J. Pekkanen, The American Connection 211-12
(1973).
106. J. Pekkanen, The American Connection 89 (1973).
107. House Report, supra note 34, at 9 (emphasis added).
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comprising some seventy-five local mechanical contractors.' This agreement
contained a "most favored nation" clause 2 which provided that if the union
granted a more favorable contract to another subcontractor it would make these
same terms available to all members of the Association.
Petitioner Connell Construction Company, a general contractor, did not do
any plumbing or mechanical work itself, but subcontracted such work to both
union and non-union subcontractors. Connell itself was a union contractor
whose employees were represented by a number of unions. Local 100 neither
represented, nor sought to represent, any of petitioner's employees.
In 1970, Connell refused to sign an agreement with Local 100 which provided,
in part, thatit would do business only with those mechanical subcontractors who
were parties to collective bargaining agreements with the union, 3 and as a result,
Local 100 picketed one of Connell's major construction sites halting construc-
tion. 4 The petitioner yielded to this pressure and signed the agreement, but
1. The Supreme Court has had little difficulty in dealing with any question of the legality of
the multi-employer bargaining unit. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664
(1965), the Court found "it beyond question that a union may conclude a wage agreement with [a]
multi-employer bargaining unit without violating the antitrust laws and that it may as a matter of
its own policy, and not by agreement with all or part of the employers of that unit, seek the same
wages from other employers." See Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 713
(1965); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 232,
275-79 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
2. The concept of the "most favored nation" clause comes from the jargon of international
trade agreements. Essentially, it means that any party to an agreement is entitled to participate in
a beneficial rate plan. See Kurt S. Adler, Inc. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 943, 947 (Cust. Ct.
1972), aff'd, 496 F.2d 1220 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (explaining most favored nation principle).
One commentator has been concerned with antitrust problems which might arise when such a
clause is included in a labor agreement. "Prohibition of 'most favored nation' and related clauses
seems a sound initial step. . . .These are devices by which employer consent to the terms of a
collective agreement is conditioned upon union imposition of identical terms on competitors or by
which the union binds itself contractually to impose such terms on others. . . .They can serve,
after all, as more than an agreement between a union and an employer, for they may also be a
signal to competing employers as to what is intended and as to the security arrangements
contemplated." Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 Yale L.J. 14, 71 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Winter).
3. The agreement, (quoted in full in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 95 S. Ct.
1830, 1834 (1975)) indicated that it was made in accordance with section 8(e) of the Labor-
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), and that neither party was seeking to have
the union represent Connell's employees. It applied only to work which Connell normally
subcontracted and not to tasks performed by Connell's own employees.
In a previous case, a similar agreement resulted in a loss of business to a non-union
subcontractor who sought injunctive relief. On a fact pattern much like Connell, the Seventh
Circuit found for the union and stated: "It thus appears that for the construction Industry,
Congress has approved such contracts as the one now before us." Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v.
Rockford Bldg. Council, 354 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966).
4. Consequently, the picketing was a secondary activity and outside the collective bargaining
context. This was noted by the dissent in Connell. "The picketing at Connell's construction site
was therefore secondary activity, subject to detailed and comprehensive regulation pursuant to
§ 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), and § 303 of the Labor
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
sought injunctive relief and invalidation of the agreement 5 claiming that it
violated the Sherman Act.6 Finding for the respondent, the district court
concluded that section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),' by
its terms, authorized the agreement." The Fifth Circuit affirmed for somewhat
different reasons. It refused to rule on the section 8(e) question on the grounds
that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) should interpret that section. 9
Rather, the court found that the union was acting alone10 and for a legitimate
union interest' I and was therefore exempt from the antitrust laws. The Supreme
Court reversed, 12 holding that the agreement neither came within the nonstatu-
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187." Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 95 S.
Ct. 1830, 1843 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"The element of 'secondary activity' is introduced when there is a refusal to have dealings with
one who has dealings with the offending person." Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 257, 271 (1959). The Connell Court majority
addressed the effect of this 'secondary' nature of the union's activity. "In this case, Local 100 had
no interest in representing Connell's employees. The federal policy favoring collective bargaining
therefore can offer no shelter for the union's coercive action against Connell or its campaign to
exclude nonunion firms from the subcontracting market." 95 S. CL at 1837. But see note 8 infra.
5. The action was originally brought in state court but was removed to federal court by
respondent. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
6. The Sherman Act renders illegal and criminal "[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
7. "Section 8(e) was part of a legislative program designed to plug technical loopholes in
§ 8(bX4)'s general prohibition of secondary activities." 95 S. Ct. at 1838; see Local 1976, Carpenters
v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93 (1958). Section 8(e) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for any
labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using,
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided,
That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an
employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or
other work .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970) (emphasis omitted).
8. 78 L.R.R.M. at 3014. This court also found that picketing to secure such an agreement
was not an illegal secondary activity. Id.; see Construction Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB, 323
F.2d 422, 426 (9th Cir. 1963); Cuneo v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 207 F. Supp. 932, 938-39
(D.N.J. 1962).
9. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1174 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd in
part, 95 S. Ct. 1830 (1975).
10. Id. at 1165-66.
11. Id. at 1167.
12. The Supreme Court affirmed both lower courts when it held that state antitrust laws were
preempted and could not be applied to this case. "Congress and this Court have carefully tailored
the [federal] antitrust statutes to avoid conflict with the labor policy favoring lawful employee
organization, not only by delineating exemptions from antitrust coverage but also by adjusting
the scope of the antitrust remedies themselves .... State antitrust laws generally have not been
subjected to this process of accommodation." 95 S. Ct. at 1842 (citation omitted); see Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-91 (1971); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
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tory antitrust exemption for organized labor, 13 nor within labor's statutory
exemption from the federal antitrust laws.14 The Court concluded that the
agreement involved substantial anticompetitive effects that were not the direct
result of the elimination of competition over wages and conditions of employ-
ment and was thus subject to the federal antitrust laws. Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 95 S. Ct. 1830 (1975).
By reason of a series of acts passed by Congress' 5 and interpreted by the
Supreme Court, 16 labor unions have enjoyed a partial exemption from the
antitrust laws. In its decisions, the Supreme Court has attempted to effect the
expressed desire of Congress. 17 It has encountered difficulty, however, because
Congress has espoused two views.
[W]e have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to try to
reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the other to
preserve the rights of labor to organize to better its conditions through the agency of
collective bargaining. We must determine here how far Congress intended activities
under one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned by the other. '
The reconciliation has been a long and difficult process. 19 Early cases held
that the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 applied to labor unions. 20 The
application of antitrust laws to labor organizations was limited somewhat in
1914 when Congress passed the Clayton Act,2' which exempted labor union
activities in pursuit of legitimate objectives22 from coverage under the an-
13. Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel- Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965).
14. See note 7 supra.
15. Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2 (Feb. Supp. 1975);
Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970); Clayton Act§ 20,29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970); Norris-La GuardiaAct, Id.
§§ 104, 105, 113 (1970); National Labor Relations ActC.VagnerAct), Id. § 151 et seq. (1970), as amended, 29
U.S.C.A. § 158(d), (g) (Supp. 1975); see Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 700-09
(1965).
16. E.g., Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (applying Hutcheson
test); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (conspiracy with non-union group
covered by antitrust laws); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (created broad
self-interest test); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (labor unions immune unless
there is actual effect or intent to affect commerce); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1921) (very narrow construction which limited Clayton Act); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208
U.S. 274 (1908) (Sherman Act applied to labor unions).
17. See, e.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 10259 (1935) (Conference Report on the Wagner Act).
18. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1945); see 483 F.2d at 1161-62
(discussion of same problem); Willis, In Defense of the Court: Accommodation of the Conflicting
National Policies, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 22 Mercer L. Rev. 561 (1971).
19. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
20. E.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 438 (1911); Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274, 302 (1908); Irving v. Neal, 209 F. 471, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); United States v,
Debs, 64 F. 724, 755 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd on other grounds, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). "Prior to the
enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914, the Supreme Court treated the Sherman Act as a broad prohibition
of activities by combinations of workers which have the effect of restricting interstate commerce." E.
Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor 30 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Employing Lathers Ass'n, 212 F.2d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1954)
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titrust laws. 23 However, subsequent decisions of the Court permitted only a
narrow application of this exemption. 24 In Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering,25 the Court found that the protection of the Clayton Act extended
only to those activities carried on within the context of an employer-employee
relationship. 26 Responding to these decisions, Congress passed the Norris-
La Guardia Act which provided that the injunction could not be used in labor
disputes to curtail the peaceful activities of organized labor. 27 The Act
specifically addressed itself to the holding in Duplex, stating that the exemp-
tion applied "regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee." 28
(combination of union and employer in restraint of trade not "a legitimate labor activity"); I.P.C.
Distrib., Inc. v. Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local 110, 132 F. Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Ill.
1955) (union attempt to determine nature of employer's movie showings not a legitimate object);
notes 37-39 infra and accompanying text.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
24. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 363 (1926); American Steel
Foundries v. Tr-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 202 (1921); Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 469-71 (1921); Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 35 F.2d 203, 207-08 (E.D. Pa. 1929). Considering the judicial disarming of the Clayton Act, one
commentator has stated. "We may also lay aside the cases interpreting sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act.
Section 6 proved empty because it was inapplicable to concerted activities in organization and collective
bargaining. Section 20 afforded immunity [only] to the immediate employees of an employer when engaged
in peaceful and lawful activities during a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment. . . .. Cox,
supra note 1, at 257 (footnote omitted). Another commentator observed that "i]n Duplex . . . and
subsequent cases the Court practically nullified §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act by interpretation, achieving
that result with respect to § 20 by a very narrow construction of the words'in any case between an emp!oyer
and employees."' E. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor 30 (1946) (emphasis & footnote
omitted).
25. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
26. Id. at 469-71.
27. "No court of the United States... shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute. .. ." 29
U.S.C. § 101 (1970). In addition, the Act specifically prohibits the courts from issuing antitrust
injunctions against labor unions or their members in pursuit of goals and activities described in
the Act. Id. §§ 102-05, 113 (1970). "The underlying aim of the Norris-La Guardia Act was
to restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but
which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1941). This statement is supported generally by
remarks of Senator Norris while presenting his "anti-injunction bill" to the Senate. "The
hardship and the injustice brought about by the issuing of injunctions by Federal judges in labor
disputes have been the subject of discussion for a number of years. The evils arising from such
injunctions have been universally recognized. A public sentiment for relief through these years
has gradually grown until the universal opinion of the patriotic people has crystallized into a
demand for legislative relief." 75 Cong. Rec. 4502 (1932).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1970). Assessing the impact of the Norris-La Guardia Act on the
Duplex decision, Professor Morris has observed:- "The Duplex decision, permitting injunctive
relief against a secondary boycott, was thus repudiated [via Norris-La Guardia]." C. Morris, The
Developing Labor Law- The Board, the Courts, and the National Labor Relations Act 808 (1971)
(emphasis omitted).
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In 1940, the Court, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,29 established a new
test based upon effect on commercial competition, 30 holding that union
activity would not come within the Sherman Act unless it was "intended to
have, or in fact [had] . . . effects on the market."' 31 This test represented a
change from previous holdings. 32 It had relatively little application, however,
"[s]ince the law took a still different turn before the Court could apply its new
test. "13 3
Only ine year later, in United States v. Hutcheson,34 the Court decided
that:
So long as [the] union act[ed] in its self-interest and [did] not combine with non-labor
groups, the licit and the illicit under §20 [of the Clayton Act] are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or
wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union
activities are the means. 35
Hutcheson's self-interest test was interpreted initially by the Supreme Court to
include anything that would inure to the benefit of the union. 3 6 Self-interest has
since been interpreted to mean anything that comes within the scope of the
legitimate objects of labor"7 or anything concerned with a labor dispute. 38 These
29. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
30. Cox, supra note 1, at 262-64.
31. 310 U.S. at 512. In Apex, the Court considered whether a strike which interfered only
minimally with interstate commerce was a violation of the Sherman Act. The Court held:
"Restraints on competition or on the course of trade in the merchandising of articles moving In
interstate commerce is not enough [to bring the conduct under the Sherman Act], unless the
restraint is shown to have or is intended to have an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise
to deprive purchasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive from free competition."
Id. at 500-01; see Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927);
United States v. Carrozzo, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd sub nom. United States v.
International Hod Carriers, 313 U.S. 539 (1941).
32. Prior to 1940, the courts had applied a number of tests to determine whether union
activities were proscribed by the Sherman Act. One such test was based upon the applicability of
the commerce clause. Local 66, United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265
U.S. 457 (1924); UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). Another test was based on the
interpretation of the Clayton Act. See cases cited at note 24 supra. A third test concerned what conduct by a
union would constitute the requisite restriction of trade or commerce. See United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd on other
grounds, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). For a discussion of these tests see Cox, supra note 1, at 256-62.
33. Cox, supra note 1, at 263.
34. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
35. Id. at 232 (footnote omitted). This language of the Hutcheson Court has been quoted
continually in explanation of its holding. E.g., Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 706 (1965); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1161 (5th Cir.
1973); 93 Cong. Rec. 3652 (1947); E. Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor 31 (1946);
Cox, supra note 1, at 265.
36. See, e.g., Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 825 (1945).
37. "The 'self-interest' of a union and its members has been treated as synonymous with 'the
legitimate objects' of organized labor." Republic Prods., Inc. v. Federation of Musicians, 245 F.
Supp. 475, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The "legitimate objects" phrasing undoubtedly came from
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apparent limitations, however, have not significantly restricted the broad
reaches of self-interest.3 9 Unions were subjected to the antitrust laws only when
they were alleged to have acted in concert with non-labor groups to effect an end
that violated those laws.40 Hutcheson offered a much broader exemption than
section 6 of the Clayton Act which proscribed interference with members and labor organizations
"carrying out the legitimate objects thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970); see Great A & P Tea Co. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 88, 410 F.2d 650, 653 (8th Cir. 1969). "The test of whether
labor union action is or is not within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act is (1) whether the action
is in the union's self-interest in an area which is a proper subject of union concern . .. ."
Intercontinental Container Transp. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884,887 (2d Cir. 1970).
38. Another view of the self-interest test came from the term "labor dispute" as defined in the
Norris-La GuardiaAct, 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1970); see, Taylor v. Local 7, Journeymen Horseshoers, 353 F.Zd
593, 602 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 969 (1966); Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n v.
United States, 236 F.2d 658, 664 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956); United States v. Fish
Smokers Trade Council, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 227, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Professor Cox issued a warning in
this regard. "[lit seems unwise to resort to restrictive interpretation of'labor dispute' as a means of cutting
down the scope of labor's present immunity from antitrust prosecution." Cox, supra note 1, at 269.
39. The Hutcheson Court proposed to interpret the term self-interest in the light of the
previous legislation on the subject. 312 U.S. at 231. Hutcheson "read the Norris-La Guardia Act's
definition of labor dispute into § 20 of the Clayton Act, and held that the acts which the
defendants were alleged to have committed were, by reason of that section, not only non-
enjoinable but not to 'be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.' " E.
Dodd, The Supreme Court and Organized Labor 31 (1946). The result has been a sweeping
exemption from antitrust laws for labor organizations. See Federation of Musicians v. Carroll,
391 U.S. 99, 105-14 (1968); Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Hunt
v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945); Bodine Produce, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 494 F.2d 541,
550-52 (9th Cir. 1974). "In short, union activity in pursuit of economic self-interest is exempt
from the antitrust laws." Winter, supra note 2, at 44. Another commentator, reviewing the
national labor policy after Hutcheson, wrote: "The national labor policy fosters, or at least
tolerates, a large-scale labor organization despite its capacity to interfere with those economic and
noneconomic objectives of the antitrust laws." Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining,
and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659 (1965). The breadth of the self-interest test, even
in the light of its interpretations, is summed up best in the language of a federal district court-
"The 'self-interest' of a union and its members has been treated as synonymous with 'the
legitimate objects' of organized labor. So long as the union acted in its self-interest, it wvas
carrying out its legitimate objects, and so long as it did that, it was exempt from the antitrust
violation, no matter what a court might think of the rightness or wrongness of its acts." Republic
Prods., Inc. v. Federation of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Willis,
In Defense of the Court Accommodation of the Conflicting National Policies, Labor and the
Antitrust Laws, 22 Mercer L. Rev. 561, 566-78 (1971); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption
After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 742, 746-62 (1966).
40. Hutcheson indicated that acting in combination with non-labor groups might subject
union activities to the provisions of the Sherman Act. See text accompanying note 35 supra. This
was affirmed in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) where the Court posed
the question: "[D]o labor unions violate the Sherman Act when, in order to further their own
interests as wage earners, they aid and abet business men to do the precise things which that Act
prohibits?" Id. at 801. The Court answered its own question in the affirmative. "[Wlhen the
unions participated with a combination of business men who had complete power to eliminate all
competition among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a situation was created
not included within the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts." Id. at 809. In
other words, "the same labor union activities may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act,
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had previously been available to organized labor. Despite some suggestions that
the Hutcheson test be limited,4 1 it remained the standard until Connell. 2
Some have argued that Congress has recognized labor as a separate field,
relatively immune from the federal antitrust laws. 43 This is supported by the
congressional declaration of purpose and policy in the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for prevent-
ing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the
rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose
activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and
management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to
protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
44
In both the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management
Relations Act Congress has addressed itself to a wide variety of labor union
activities. 45 Many judges have considered whether Congress intended its
dependent upon whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups." Id. at
810. See also Local 167, Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); United States v. Brims,
272 U.S. 549 (1926). "The test, as it has come down in various Supreme Court opinions, seems to
turn on the union's combination with non-labor groups to create a monopoly among various
conspiratory interests. In other words, the purposes sought by the conspiracy must have goals
which go beyond legitimate union alms and result in an anticompetitive situation." Connell
Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1158 (Sth Cir. 1973).
In his dissenting opinion in the principal case, Justice Douglas indicated that perhaps a
showing of a conspiracy might have altered his decision in this case, "The question of antitrust
immunity would be far different, however, if it were alleged that Local 100 had conspired with
mechanical subcontractors to force nonunion subcontractors from the market by entering into
exclusionary agreements with general contractors like Connell." 95 S. Ct. at 1843 (dissenting
opinion).
41. "The fact that the parties to the agreement are but a single employer and the unions
representing its employees does not compel immunity for the agreement." Local 189, Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965). "Unquestionably the Board's demarcation of
the bounds of the duty to bargain has great relevance to any consideration of the sweep of labor's
antitrust immunity, for we are concerned here with harmonizing the Sherman Act with the
national policy expressed in the National Labor Relations Act . UMW v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657, 665 (1965).
42. See, e.g., Webb v. Bladen, 480 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Pennington, 400
F.2d 806, 814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983 (1968); lodice v. Calabrese, 345 F. Supp. 248, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Republic Prods., Inc. v. Federation of Musicians, 245 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); see also Comment, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Pennington and Jewel Tea, 66 Colum.
L. Rev. 742 (1966).
43. See generally UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 697-735 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring & dissenting).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1970).
45. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) (unfair labor practices); id. § 187 (1970) (provides
private action for damages due to unfair labor practices). "Congress selected with great care the
sanctions to be imposed if proscribed union activity should occur." 95 S. Ct. at 1843 (dissenting
opinion).
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labor legislation as an exclusive source of remedies in the field.46 Professor
Meltzer has noted that:
Congress, by amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), regulated
such practices and proscribed conduct such as secondary boycotts and jurisdictional
disputes that prior to Hutcheson had been condemned or attacked under the Sherman
Act.
47
The main questions raised in Connell were whether the remedies provided in
the labor law were intended to be exclusive in all cases48 and if not,49 should they
be exclusive in this particular case.
In reaching its decision in Connell, the Court seemed to apply a pre-
Hutcheson test"0 to determine whether the union activity was exempt from
the antitrust laws. The Court acknowledged that the union's actions were
legal and in its own self-interest and therefore in compliance with the
Hutcheson requirements for exemption. It merely sought to organize sub-
contractors in the area, a legitimate object for such a union to pursue. 5'
Moreover, there was no evidence or allegation of any conspiracy with a
non-labor group.5 2 In refusing to include this agreement within the labor
exemption, the Court looked not to motivation but to effect, a test which
Hutcheson seemingly rendered obsolete. 53 The Court stated:
This record contains no evidence that the union's goal was anything other than
organizing as many subcontractors as possible .... But the methods the union chose
46. E.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 95 S. Ct. at 1843 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring
& dissenting);.NLRB v. Local 449, Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 92-96 (1957) (Brennan, J.); United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 243 (1941) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
47. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi. L
Rev. 659, 669 (1965) (footnote omitted); see W. Wilson, Labor Law Handbook 377-83 (1963);
Note, Accommodation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to Other Federal Statutes, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
354 (1958).
48. See generally note 45 supra.
49. "My view that Congress intended that collective bargaining activity on mandatory
subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act not be subject to the antitrust laws does not mean
that I believe that Congress intended that activity involving all nonmandatory subjects of
bargaining be similarly exempt." Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 732
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring & dissenting); see United States v. Olympia Provision & Baking Co., 282
F. Supp. 819, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afl'd sub nom. Provision Salesmen Union v. United States, 393 U.S.
480 (1969); United States v. Local 639, Teamsters, 32 F. Supp. 594, 598 (D.D.C. 1940).
50. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text. Many critics, induding the ABA, have
urged a return to the Apex standard. See Cox, supra note 1, at 263, 280.
51. 95 S. Ct. at 1836. Generally speaking, organizational picketing is a legitimate union
activity. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1970); International Hod Carriers, Local 840, 135 N.L.R.B.
1153, 1155 (1962).
52. 95 S. CL at 1836 n.2, 1843 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Thus the one broad exception
to the antitrust immunity for labor did not apply. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
53. "In 1941, the doubts and problems left by the Apex opinion were swept into limbo by a
series of decisions [ United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); United States v. Building & Consir.
Trades Council, 313 U.S. 539 (1941); United States v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 313 U.S. 539 (1941);
Unites States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 318 U.S. 741 (1943)] resulting from ... prosecutionlsl of
labor unions." Cox, supra note 1, at 264.
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are not immune from antitrust sanctions simply because the goal is legal .... This kind
of direct restraint on the business market has substantial anticompetitive effects, both
actual and potential, that would not follow naturally from the elimination of com-
petition over wages and working conditions. It contravenes antitrust policies to a de-
gree not justified by congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatu-
tory exemption from the antitrust law.
5 4
While the courts have insisted all along that the right of labor unions to be
exempt was not absolute,5 5 yet except for certain circumstances,1 6 it was
apparent to some commentators that it was indeed absolute.57 The reason was
that the Hutcheson test was simply too broad.5 8 In Connell, the Court has
limited the extent of the labor union antitrust exemption, apparently because the
balance59 between competitive business economy and labor's right to organize,
at least in this case, seems to have swung the other way.60 The union's actions
created a direct restraint on competition 6 1 to an extent that the Court refused to
54. 95 S. Ct. at 1836.
55. See note 49 supra; UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Adams Dairy Co. v. St.
Louis Dairy Co., 260 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1958); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and
the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev. 659, 689-701 (1965).
56. See note 40 supra.
57. "The ruling [Hutcheson] theoretically may be limited, but the practical consequence was to make
the Sherman Act inapplicable to all combinations of employees regardless of the objective." Cox,
supra note 1, at 265 (footnote omitted); see note 39 supra.
58. "The fault is that the decision may have been too sweeping. To accept the view that the
Sherman Act is not a proper vehicle for evolving a comprehensive law of strikes and picketing
does not require one to say that employees may combine to impose restraints on competition
which would be unlawful when imposed by employers--for example, fixing the market price. The
legality of such restraints should be judged [separately] .... In the absence of fraud or violence,
the Hutcheson case immunized any restraint of trade imposed by a labor union." Cox, supra note
1, at 265. "[Circumstances surrounding Hutcheson] may have induced the majority to place its
decision upon broader grounds than the controversy demanded." 54 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 888
(1941).
59. See text accompanying note 18 supra. "In recent years the Supreme Court has had to
struggle with the problem of balancing these recognized congressional objectives." 483 F.2d at
1162.
60. See generally Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 63 F.
Supp. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 155 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1946).
61. "The agreements with Connell and other general contractors indiscriminately excluded
nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market, even if their competitive advantages were
not derived from substandard wages and working conditions but rather from more efficient
operating methods." 95 S. Ct. at 1835. "The multiemployer bargaining agreement. . . is relevant
in determining the effect that the agreement between Local 100 and Connell would have on the
business market The 'most favored nation' dause . . . promised to eliminate competition between
members of the Association and any other subcontractors that Local 100 might organize ....
[T]he restriction on subcontracting would eliminate competition on all subjects covered by the
multiemployer agreement, even on subjects unrelated to wages, hou's and working conditions." Id.
at 1835-36 (footnote omitted). "Success ... would also give Local 100 power to control access to the
market for mechanical subcontracting work .... Such control could result in significant adverse
effects on the market and on consumers, effects unrelated to the union's legitimate goals of organizing
workers and standardizing working conditions." Id. at 1836.
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permit. "Labor policy clearly does not require, however, that a union have
freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those who employ its
members."'62 While the decision in United States v. Hutcheson has not been
overruled, 63 it certainly has been narrowed.
The union also alleged that it came within the statutory exemption and
argued that (1) the agreement which was concluded with the general con-
tractor was authorized by section 8(e) of the NLRA; 64 (2) jurisdiction to decide
whether such an interpretation should be given to section 8(e) lay exclusively
with the NLRB; 65 and (3) that if the NLRA was violated by the union's
conduct, then the remedies provided for such action by the NLRA are
exclusive. 66
Section 8(e) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization and an employer to enter into an agreement whereby the
employer agrees to refrain from doing business with any other employer.
However, it specifically exempts agreements between unions and employers in
the construction industry when such agreements relate to the subcontracting
of work to be done at the construction site. 67 The Supreme Court held that
the spirit and not the letter of the law must control and that the agreement
was not protected by section 8(e).6 8
The Court had little difficulty discarding the Fifth Circuit's finding6" that
jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the NLRA to specific situations
lay solely with the NLRB. The Court held that "federal courts may decide
labor law questions that emerge as collateral issues in suits brought under
independent federal remedies, including the antitrust laws."17 0
The four dissenting justices in ConneU took issue with the assertion that
antitrust remedies applied. The thrust of their conclusion was that, assuming
there was a violation, the remedies were provided exclusively by the national
labor law.
In sum, the legislative history of the 1947 and 1959 amendments and additions to
national labor law clearly demonstrates that Congress did not intend to restore
antitrust sanctions for secondary boycott activity such as that engaged in by Local 100
in this case, but rather intended to subject such activity only to regulation under the
National Labor Relations Act and § 303 of the Labor Management Relations
Act. The judicial imposition of 'independent federal remedies' not intended by Con-
gress, no less than the application of state law to union conduct that is either protected
62. Id. at 1835.
63. Hutcheson is cited with approval by the Court in this case. Id. at 1835.
64. Id. at 1837; see note 7 supra.
65. Id. at 1837.
66. I& at 1840.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970); see note 7 supra.
68. 95 S. Ct. at 1840. Ruling on the same question, the District Court found it clear that
§ 8(e) did protect the agreement. 78 L.R.R.M. at 3014. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
refused to address the issue, holding thatsuch aquestion was within the province of the NLRB. 483 F.2d at
1174.
69. 483 F.2d at 1169.
70. 95 S. CL at 1837.
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or prohibited by federal labor law, threatens 'to upset the balance of power between
labor and management expressed in our national labor policy.'
7 1
The dissent found that the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley7 2 and the
Landrum-Griffin Acts 73 warranted only the conclusion that "Congress de-
liberately chose not to subject unions engaging in prohibited secondary
activity to the sanctions of the antitrust laws."'74 On the other hand, the
majority opinion held that:
There is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress suggesting that labor-law remedies
for § 8(e) violations were intended to be exclusive, or that Congress thought
allowing antitrust remedies in cases like the present one would be inconsistent with the
remedial scheme of the NLRA. 75
Thus the Court looked to the specific statutes cited by the respondent 76 and
concluded that they did not offer the union protection either from the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or from the application of the antitrust
laws. 77
While the Court technically did not decide whether Local 100's agreement
with the petitioner constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, 78 it strongly
implied that this was the case. 79 It did hold that a union, acting legally,
unilaterally,8 0 and in its own self-interest is, under certain circumstances, 8'
subject to the antitrust laws. 82 This decision will expand the role of the
judiciary8 3 since it requires balancing the policies favoring free competition
71. Id. at 1851 (footnote omitted).
72. In Congress, Senator Taft explained the intention of his bill as providing a remedy for
labor antitrust problems "parallel" to antitrust remedies for illegal business activities. 93 Cong.
Rec. 4872-73 (1947).
73. Rep. Griffin made it clear that his bill intentionally excluded any antitrust provisions. 105
Cong. Rec. 15535 (1959).
74. 95 S. Ct. at 1844.
75. Id. at 1841 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 1837, 1840; 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970) (expanding unfair labor practices to include
secondary activity and containing the exemption for the construction industry); id, §§ 160(1), 187 (1970)
(provides remedies for parties injured by activities rendered illegal by § 158); see note 7 supra.
77. 95 S. Ct. at 1841.
78. Id. at 1837.
79. "[Tjhis agreement.. . has a potential for restraining competition in the business market In
ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working
conditions." Id. at 1841; see id. at 1835.
80. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra. See also notes 61 supra & 86 infra.
82. 95 S. Ct. at 1841.
83. Hutcheson had provided a test which seemed to limit the role of the judiciary to a greater
extent than ever before. It provided a guideline that the courts could apply simply. 312 U.S. at
231-32; see cases cited at note 53 supra; Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154
(5th Cir. 1973); Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. Council, 354 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966). "Hutcheson was the right decision, therefore, not because as a
matter of national policy unions should be free to pursue their economic self-interest to the limit but
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with those favoring "the association of employees to eliminate competition
over wages and working conditions." 8 4 Moreover, as in the past, it may draw
a response from Congress."
The immediate effect of Connell is unclear. It reopens a door which
Hutcheson seemed to have effectively closed. However, there are fac-
tors8 6 which may allow the case to be distinguished. This makes an attempt
to assess its impact difficult at this time. The test of "direct restraint on the
business market [with] substantial anticompetitive effects ... that would not
follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working
conditions"87 is vague and subject to further interpretation.8 8 The significance of
Connell may be that the Supreme Court of the United States concurred with
Circuit Judge Clark's dissent. "I cannot agree that a labor organization enjoys a
virtually total immunity from federal antitrust jurisdiction.18 9
John A. Anderson
because that judgment was left to more appropriate governmental institutions." Winter, supra note 2,
at 45. Winter was dissatisfied with the idea of extensive judicial involvement in this area. "The courts
have, for some seventy-odd years, sought to harmonize the conflicting policies of collective
bargaining and competition. But the conflict is so irreconcilable that, apart from entirely subordinat-
ing one to the other, the regulatory distinctions employed must be largely arbitrary-there are no
general principles by which these policies can be harmonized. And since the courts generally must
rely on principle in the exercise of the judicial function, their record is not a happy one." Id. at 16-17.
Another commentator has concluded. "Experience gives us no reason to have confidence in the ability
of judges to handle labor problems." Sovern, Some Ruminations on Labor, the Antitrust Laws and
Allen Bradley, 13 Lab. L.J. 957, 963 (1962) (footnote omitted). While Professor Cox's language is less
severe, his thoughts were basically similar. "[Tlhe experience of organized labor under the Sherman
Act seems adequate justification for insisting that only the truly borderline cases be left for judicial
decision." Cox, supra note 1, at 283. Cox has submitted a sample piece of legislation as a suggested
guideline for a possible solution. Id. at 284 n. 117.
84. 95 S. CL at 1835.
85. See notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 61 supra. Distinctive factors in Connell include: (1) the multi-employer unit uith
the "most favored nation" clause; (2) the lack of a collective bargaining relationship between the
parties to the agreement; (3) the agreement permitting subcontracting only to those having an
agreement with the particular local to subcontract; (4) the inevitable result of "top-down"
organizing ("top-down" organizing refers to efforts by management to cause employees to join a
union rather than vice-versa) and (5) unavailable labor law remedies. "Defendant [Local 1001 sent
a similar contract to the one involved in this case to K.A.S. Construction Company in
Richardson, Texas, and picketed the company. K.A.S. refused to sign the proposed agreement
and made a complaint to the Regional [NLRB] in Fort Worth, Texas. The NLRB refused to issue a
complaint and appeal was filed with the General Counsel of the NLRB in Washington. On August
30, 1970, the appeal was denied by the General Counsel." 78 L.R.R-M. at 3013-14.
87. 95 S. Ct. at 1836.
88.' E.g., Questions as to the standards or criteria for measuring "direct restraint" or
"substantial anticompetitive effects" have not been clearly resolved in Connell. The question of
what "follows naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and working conditions"
may also prove to be fertile ground for judicial speculation and interpretation.
89. 483 F.2d at 1175-76.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Workman's Compensation-New York Court of Appeals Holds That
Mental Injury Precipitated by Psychic Trauma Is Compensable-On June
9, 1971 John Forman, a department store security director, committed suicide.
The claimant, his secretary, found him lying in a pool of blood. Forman had a
history of becoming "agitated and nervous" due to the annual pressures of the
Christmas season. Following the 1970 season the pressures did not abate and he
became increasingly concerned about his job performance. The firing of a fellow
security director at a neighboring store intensified his fears. Forman regularly
confided these fears to the claimant, who, in an effort to ease his burden and
boost his morale, increasingly assumed certain of his responsibilities.
After the suicide, the claimant alleged that she was beset by an obsessive
feeling of guilt because of her failure to prevent Forman's death. There was no
dispute that these guilt feelings developed into an "acute depressive reaction."
Claimant lost twenty pounds and ultimately had to leave work for approxi-
mately six months. During these months she underwent two periods of hospitali-
zation, receiving psychotherapy, medication and three weeks of shock treat-
ment. The referee granted claimant's demand for compensation and the work-
men's compensation board affirmed. On appeal, the Appellate Division re-
versed, holding that mental injury precipitated solely by psychic trauma was not
compensable as a matter of law.' The Court of Appeals in turn reversed,
sustaining the recovery. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d
505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975).
Workmen's compensation developed as an alternative to traditional tort
remedies which denied recovery to workmen injured on the job. 2 At common
law, a worker claiming damages for on the job injuries was confronted with
three recovery-defeating defenses known as the "unholy trinity."3 If the worker
was partly at fault in the accident, "contributory negligence" barred his recov-
ery.4 On the other hand, if a fellow-worker was responsible for the injury, the
injured worker's action would fall within the "fellow-servant rule." s Finally if
the contract of employment could be construed to subject the worker to the risk
of injury, the defense of "assumption of the risk" would effectively bar his
claim. 6
1. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 44 App. Div. 2d 739, 354 N.Y.S.2d 470 (3d Dep't 1974),
rev'd, 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1975).
2. Horovitz, Injury and Death Under Workmen's Compensation Laws 8 (1944) [hereinafter cited
as Horovitz].
3. W. Prosser, Torts § 80, at 526-27 (4th ed. 1971).
4. See, e.g., Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 220 U.S. 590, 596-97 (1911); Narramore v.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 96 F. 298,305 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 175 U.S. 724 (1899); Limberg
v. Glenwood Lumber Co., 127 Cal. 598, 60P. 176 (1900); Meunierv. Chemical Paper Co., 180 Mass.
109, 61 N.E. 810 (1901).
5. See, e.g., Farwell v. Boston & W.R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842); Coon v. Syracuse & U.
R.R., 6 Barb. 231 (1849), aff'd, 5 N.Y. 492 (1851); Ryan v. Cumberland Valley R.R., 23 Pa. 384
(1854).
6. See, e.g., Lang v. United States Reduction Co., 110 F.2d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 1940);
Ehrenberger v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 182 Iowa 1339, 1342, 166 N.W. 735, 736 (1918); Cooper v.
Mayes, 234 S.C. 491,495, 109 S.E.2d 12, 15 (1959); Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, Inc., 31 Wash.
2d 396, 406, 197 P.2d 233, 238 (1948).
[Vol. 44
1975] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the late nineteenth century, Germany and England enacted laws which for
the first time compensated workers for work-related injuries not on a theory of
negligence, but solely because of their relationship to the job.7 Early in the
twentieth century, support grew in the United States for similar laws," and by
1920 the vast majority of states had enacted them.9 All of these statutes were
intended to be complete substitutes for common law tort recovery)10 They
focused on the economic plight of employees injured in the course of employment
rather than on the identity of the wrongdoer."
Arguably, the proper implementation of the legislative purpose underlying
workmen's compensation laws requires the circumvention of common law rules
and methods. 12 Nevertheless, courts have regularly applied common law
concepts to workmen's compensation cases. 13 Thus, for example, in such cases
New York applied the traditional "contact rule," which required that there be
some physical contact or injury before recovery would be allowed. The statute,
however, merely required that an injury be "accidental."'' 4
7. Horovitz, supra note 2, at 5. In the present New York law compensable injuries are only those
"accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment... ."N.Y. Workmen's Comp.
Law § 2(7) (McKinney 1965). The courts are expected to interpret this phrase broadly in order to
realize the humane purpose of the statute. Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N.Y. 148, 154, 112 N.E. 750, 752
(1916). The injury notonly must be incurred on the job, but must be a natural result of that work. Id.
at 152, 112 N.E. at 751.
8. There were several false starts. An early Montana law was held unconstitutional. Cunning-
ham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 P. 554 (1911). New York's first
workmen's compensation law, Law of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, [1910) Laws of New York, was held
unconstitutional one year after enactment. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431
(1911). In 1917 the United States Supreme Court in a trio of cases upheld the constitutionality of the
states' workmen's compensation laws. See New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917);
Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U.S. 210 (1917); and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219
(1917).
9. See generally 1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Larson].
10. See Horovitz, supra note 2, at 8.
11. E.g., Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 697, 75 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1947).
12. See Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941).
13. "Almost every major error... in the development of compensation law, whether judicial or
legislative, can be traced... to the importation of tort ideas . " I Larson, supra note 9, § 1.20, at
2-3.
One tort concept frequently incorporated into the statutes was that of "proximate cause" or
"foreseeability." See, e.g., Hewitt's Case, 225 Mass. 1, 113 N.E. 572 (1916); Hopper v. Industrial
Comm'n, 71 Ohio App. 156,48 N.E.2d 125 (1943); Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 197 Tenn. 135, 270
S.W.2d 389 (1954); Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 130 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939). Butsee
Corken v. Corken Steel Prods., Inc., 385 S.W.2d 949 (Ky. 1965).
In Wolfe the dissent seemed to urge the use of another tort concept-that of denial of recovery to
innocent bystanders for purely mental injury. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d SOS,
511, 330 N.E.2d 603, 608, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 644 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting). See notes 70-74 infra
and accompanying text.
14. New York's statute defines "injury" and "personal injury" to mean "only accidental injuries
arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally and
unavoidably result therefrom." N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 2(7) (McKinney 1965). Some states
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The "contact rule" in New York tort law was first enunciated in Mitchell v.
RochesterRy. Is The court there held that although the plaintiff had fainted and
suffered a miscarriage because of the defendant's negligent handling of his
horses, there could be "no recovery.., for mere fright."' 6 The court justified its
decision by citing the need to avoid both "fictions or speculative claims" and a
"flood of litigation.117 Mitchell remained the law of New York'" until 1961,
when the "contact" rule, as applied to tort law, was laid to rest in Battalla v.
State. '9
In workmen's compensation cases the "contact" rule had been applied
principally in situations where mental injuries resulted from physical causes or
where mental or physical injuries resulted from mental or emotional stimuli.
These cases have been grouped into three categories: those involving physical
impact producing psychological injury (physical-mental); those where psychic
trauma produces physical injury (mental-physical); and cases where psychic
trauma produces psychological injury (mental-mental).20
The "physical-mental" cases satisfy the "contact" requirement and courts have
seldom had any problem in affirming awards made by the workmen's
compensation board. The main question in these cases is usually a factual one:
did the physical event cause the mental injury? Where the board has based its
require a seemingly more stringent test. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1021(7) (1964) ("violence to the
physical structure of the body"); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 287.020(3) (Vernon 1965) ("violence to the physical
structure of the body"); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 8306, § 20 (Vernon 1967) ("damage or harm to
the physical structure of the body"). Interestingly, however, the courts of both Texas and Missouri
have interpreted their statutes broadly to allow recovery for purely mental injuries which involved no
contact. Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (neurosis which developed after
claimant accidentally ran over co-worker with truck prevented him from continuing as a truck
driver); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955) (neurosis produced
by nearly falling offscaffold and seeing co-worker killed prevented claimant from being able to work
on a scaffold). Contra, Hackett v. Travellers Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (no
recovery for "trauma psychosis" developed after being 80 feet from explosion which killed two other
men).
15. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
16. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
17. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. In Wolfe, Chief Judge Breitel argued in his dissent, "The holding
in this case does not open a door [to a flood of litigation], but tears down a whole side of the structure,"
36 N.Y.2d 505, 513, 330 N.E.2d 603, 608, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 644 (1975) (Breitel, C.J., dissenting).
On this point Prof. Prosser states, "It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even
at the expense of a'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any
court of justice to deny relief on such grounds." W. Prosser, Torts § 12, at 51 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
18. During the long reign of the "contact" rule, however, courts found ways of circumventing It.
See, e.g., In re Wilson, 257 N.Y. 230, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) where plaintiff's testatrix left a car
after an accident, fainted from nervous shock, and fractured her skull on sidewalk. The court held
that the physical injury was within the realm of defendant's anticipation.
19. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (infant plaintiff allowed recovery
for fright resulting from ski-lift ride when employee failed to properly secure belt).
20. See generally IA Larson, supra note 9, §§ 42.20-.24; E. Render, Mental Illness as an
Industrial Accident, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 288 (1964).
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findings on some "substantial evidence," 21 the courts must rely on these
findings. 22 Under this constraint the courts have affirmed awards for mental
injuries which resulted from, for example, an accidental wrist injury,2 3 a blow
on the forehead, 24 and a fall from scaffolding.25
Adherence to the "substantial evidence rule" has resulted in cases from which
little can be drawn by way of legal principle other than the conclusion that the
board's interpretation of the facts will be sustained. For example, in Edmonds v.
Kalfaian & Son, Inc., 2 6 the court affirmed the board's finding that the
amputation of claimant's arm shortly after an industrial accident caused
claimant's mental illness nine years later. In Krasinski v. American Brass Co.,
27
on the other hand, the court affirmed the board's denial of a claim for
compensation for a psychosis which developed ten years after an industrial
accident.
In cases involving "mental-physical" injuries no "contact" exists, but com-
pensation for such injuries is well established in most jurisdictions.28 New York
courts have consistently affirmed awards in this context.2 9 In Church v. County
of Westchester,30 the decedent, who had designed and constructed an amuse-
21. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a requirement of "substantial evidence" is
no different from a requirement of "any evidence." Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.S. 280 (1935).
Impliedly, then, an appellate court must uphold the board's findings if those findings were supported
by any evidence atall. New York may require a more stringent test. This test requires "evidence .
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the board."
See, e.g., Schechter v. State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506, 513, 160 N. E.2d 901, 905, 190 N.Y.S.2d 656,
662 (1959). A finding of fact based on no evidence is an error of law and acourt may reverse. 3 Larson,
supra note 9, § 80.10, at 246-47.
22. "The decision of the board shall be final as to all questions of fact .... N.Y. Workmen's
Comp. Law § 20 (McKinney 1965).
23. Kniefv. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 748, 291 N.Y.S.2d 463 (3d Dep't
1968).
24. McGuirk v. J.J. Harrington & Co., 262 App. Div. 980, 30 N.Y.S.2d 68 (3d Dep't 194 1).
25. Trgo v. Harris Structural Steel Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 856, 214 N.Y.S.Zd 791 (3d Dep't
1961).
26. 9 App. Div. 2d 551, 189 N.Y.S.2d 456 (3d Dep't 1959).
27. 12 App. Div. 2d 827, 209 N.Y.S.2d 335 (3d Dep't 1961).
28. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 109 Cal. App. 637, 241
P.2d 299 (1st Dist.), affd, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952) (stroke caused by sixty-five days of
tension while negotiating a labor contract); Marotte v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 145 Colo. 99,
357 P.2d 915 (1960) (emotional strain of being in auto accident caused policeman's heart attack);
Roberts v. Dredge Fund, 71 Idaho 30, 232 P.2d 975 (1951) (claimant intestate's heart stopped after
she was frightened by "fire ball" from short circuit); J.N. Geipe, Inc. v. Collett, 172 Md. 16S, 190 A.
836 (1937) (excitement of trying to avoid automobile collision caused driver's paralysis); Klein v. Len
H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922) (worker who accidentally caused co-worker's
death suffered fatal shock); Hall v. Doremus, 114 N.J.L. 47, 175 A. 369 (1934) (worker fainted while
witnessing birth of calf and fractured his skull); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hart, 315 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1958) (laundry employee suffered stroke because of customer's berating); see also State
Compensation Fund v. Industrial Comm'n., 535 P.2d 623 (Ariz. CL App. 1975) (anxiety resulting
from hitting pedestrian caused employee's heart attack).
29. See text accompanying notes 30-37 infra.
30. 253 App. Div. 859, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581 (3d Dep't 1938).
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ment park ride on which a child was injured, testified on behalf of his employer in
the subsequent negligence suit. During cross examination he became agitated
and nervous, and suffered a fatal coronary occlusion. The board's award of
compensation was affirmed by the court.
In Klimas v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc. 31 the decedent was director of
maintenance and engineering for the respondent airline when one of two aircraft
of which he had charge was grounded by the Civil Aeronautics Authority. The
employer held the decedent responsible for this "sheer negligence." 32 The bill for
the repair of the planes was extremely high, though the decedent made intensive
efforts to have the cost reduced. At the "climax" of these efforts, the decedent
suffered a fatal heart attack. The Court of Appeals, reinstating an award by the
workmen's compensation board, held that an accident need not be a sudden
occurrence to be compensable under the workmen's compensation law. 33 The
court observed that mental strain from work is frequently more devastating
than mere physical injury. 34
Subsequent toKlimas, New York courts have affirmed awards in cases where:
a claimant suffered a heart attack after narrowly avoiding an automobile
accident in a company car; 35 an overworked sales executive on an extremely tight
meeting schedule suffered a stroke after an emergency plane landing;36 and a
judge had a fatal heart attack as a result of working unusually long hours after
being directed to clear up the court calendar. 37
In contrast with the general willingness of courts to affirm awards in the
"mental-physical" and "physical-mental" categories, some American juris-
dictions have been reluctant to affirm awards in the "mental-mental" category. 38
Arguably, this reluctance is attributable to the courts' insistence on some
"physical" element3 9 analogous to that required by the "contact rule."'40 The
English courts, however, rejected the requirement of physical contact or
physical injury at an early date, 4 1 and in recent times the majority of American
jurisdictions have followed this example. 42
31. 10 N.Y.2d 209, 176 N.E.2d 714, 219 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1961).
32. Id. at 211, 176 N.E.2d at 715, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
33. Accord, Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 109 Cal. App. 637, 241
P.2d 299 (Ist Dist.), aff'd, 39 Cal. 2d 831, 250 P.2d 148 (1952).
34. 10 N.Y.2d at 213, 182 N.E.2d at 716, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
35. Eckhausv. AdeckStores, Inc., 11 N.Y.2d 862, 182 N.E.2d 287, 227 N.Y.S.2d 680(1962).
36. Lobman v. Bernard Altmann Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 931, 244 N.Y.S.2d 425 (3d Dep't 1963),
aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 506, 202 N.E.2d 559, 254 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1964).
37. Major v. New York State Ct. of Claims, 31 App. Div. 2d 993, 297 N.Y.S.2d 768 (3d Dep't
1969) (per curiam).
38. See, e.g., Shope v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Ariz. App. 23, 495 P.2d 148 (1972) (neurosis
caused by emotional stress over period of years); Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312, 160
S.E.2d 424 (1968) (emotional upset at work resulted in loss of use of arm).
39. See I Larson, supra note 9, § 42.23, at 7-373.
40. See notes 14-19 supra and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Yates v. South Kirkby, & Collieries, Ltd., [191012 K.B. 538 (court affirmed award
for damages resulting from inability of claimant to work at coal face because of mental shock brought
about when falling timber killed fellow workman despite claimant's rescue attempt).
42. See, e.g., Baker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 18 Cal. App. 3d 852, 96 Cal:
[Vol. 44
1975] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Prior to Wolfe, the New York courts had never affirmed an award for a
"mental-mental" injury and New York law was in a state of confusion on this
matter.43 The Court of Appeals had repeatedly refused to decide whether
psychic injuries produced by psychic trauma were compensable as a matter of
law."
In Chernin v. Progress Service Co. 45 the claimant, a New York City taxi
driver, struck a pedestrian who darted in front of his cab. The driver suffered no
physical injuries, but became abusive to a policeman on the scene and created a
disturbance. Approximately one month after the accident, he was admitted to a
hospital with a mental condition. 46 The Court of Appeals avoided the legal issue
Rptr. 279 (4th Dist- 1971) (fireman claimed to have been disabled by "cardiac neurosis" caused by
stresses and anxieties of employment); Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1954) (though claimant
suffered no visible injury, she experienced chest pains after building had been struck by lightning);
Carter v. General Motors Corp., 361 Mich. 577, 106 N.W.2d 105 (1960) (claimant's psychosis
triggered by worry over inability to keep up with assembly line); Simon v. R.H.H. Steel Laundry,
Inc., 25 N.J. Super. 50, 95 A.2d 446, aff'd, 26 N.J. Super. 598, 98 A.2d 604 (1953) (explosion of steel
pipe produced psycho-neurotic disability but no physical injury); Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co.,
154 Tex. 430. 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955) (claimant's disabling neurosis caused by nearly falling off
scaffold after support cable broke and seeing co-worker killed in same incident); Burlington Mills
Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941) (claimant's disabling neurosis occurred several
weeks after being frightened by electric flash from short circuit). See generally I Larson, supra note 9,
§ 42.23.
43. See Comment, Mental Stress and Mental Injury in New York Workmen's Compensation, 16
Buffalo L. Rev. 727, 736 (1967).
44. The confusion was compounded by a series of cases bypassing each other in the court
structure. In Chernin v. Progress Service Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't
1959), affd, 9 N.Y.2d 880, 175 N.E.2d 827, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1961), the Third Department
reversed an award by the workmen's compensation board for a"mental-mental" injury, holding that
"[there is] nothing in the law that connotes purely excessive emotions--anger, grief or other mental
feelings--unaccompanied by physical force or exertion can be the basis of an accident." Id. at 172,
192 N.Y.S.2d at 760. See text accompanying notes 45-48 infra. Before Chernin had reached the
Court of Appeals, the board denied an award in another "mental-mental" case, considering itself
bound as a matter of law by the Appellate Division's holding in Chernin. See Straws v. Fail, 17 App.
Div. 2d 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893 (3d Dep't 1962), motion for leave to appeal denied, 12 N.Y.2d 647
(1963). See text accompanying notes 49-51 infra- Before Straws reached the Appellate Division,
however, the Court of Appeals heard Chernin, supra, and avoided the legal issue of compensability
for such mental injuries by deciding on the facts that the claimant had suffered no accidental injury. 9
N.Y.2d 880, 175 N.E.2d 827, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1961). See text accompanying notes 47-48 infra.
Shortly after the Chernin opinion in the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division noted in another
case that the Court of Appeals had left the law open as to "mental-mental" cases. See Schwartz v.
Hampton House Management Corp., 14 App. Div. 2d 936, 221 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dep't 1961)
(decided on other grounds). When Straws reached the Appellate Division the folloving year,
however, the court ignored the Court of Appeals opinion in Chernin, and affirmed the board's denial
of an award on the basis of its own reasoning in Chernin. 17 App. Div. 2d at 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d at
894. Arguably, the court believed there was no reason to modify its own Chernin holding, since the
final determination of the legal question must be made by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court
of Appeals refused to review Straws, 12 N.Y.2d 647 (1963); so the uncertainty continued.
45. 9 N.Y.2d 880, 175 N.E.2d 827, 216 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1961), aff'g 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192
N.Y.S.2d 758 (3d Dep't 1959).
46. There was a factual dispute as to whether the accident caused the mental illness. Testimony
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by holding that, on the facts, the claimant suffered no accidental injury at the
time of the original mishap. 47 As to the legal issue involved the court stated: "We
do not decide whether an occurrence arising out of and in the course of
employment which causes psychological trauma may in any case be compensable
even though there was no physical injury."'48
The same issue came before the courts in Straws v. Fail.49 The claimant in
Straws was a porter at a billiard parlor who was directed by his employer to
accompany a stricken co-worker to the hospital. En route, the co-worker col-
lapsed and died in the claimant's arms. The claimant contended that as a result
of the experience he suffered headaches, dizziness, weakness, pain, insomnia
and nausea, all of which caused a year-long psychological disablement. 50 The
Court of Appeals refused to review an Appellate Division ruling affirming the
board's decision that the alleged injury was not compensable as a matter of
law. 51
This refusal of the Court of Appeals to decide the issue of compensability for
"mental-mental" injuries was widely criticized. 5 2 Larson was particularly acid in
his criticism:
It might be a good thing to remind our appellate courts from time to time that, under a
system of law made up in large degree of case decisions, the building up of a reasonably
complete body of law often depends on the accident of whether a suitable set of facts gets
into appellate litigation. When a perfect opportunity to clear up an important unsettled
point does happen at last to come along-as it did in the Straws case--the refusal of the
court of last resort to discharge its decisional responsibility is inexplicable. How long will
it be before another clean-cut case of mental stimulus creating mental injury reaches the
Court of Appeals? . . .It is difficult to see why the New York courts should in 1963
be indecisive about a concept which the King's Bench accepted without difficulty in
1910 . . . 3
In Wolfe the Court of Appeals went to some length to reconcile its opinion with
Larson's views.5 4 At the outset of its opinion the court distinguished the basic
the board received from the claimant's brother relating to the claimant's alleged personality change
after the accident conflicted with that received from associates of the claimant's employer. 9 App.
Div. 2d at 171, 192 N.Y.S.2d at 758; see note 57 infra.
47. 9 N.Y.2d at 881, 175 N.E.2d at 827-28, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
48. Id. Judge Dye, in dissent, cited decisions in other state courts favorable to claimants and
stated that he did not think the issues should be avoided: "There is no good reason for postponing
decision of the clear-cut and important question posed by this case, that is, whether compensation is
payable for a mental injury precipitated by a mental cause without physical impact." Id. at 882, 175
N.E.2d at 828, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (Dye, J., dissenting).
49. 17 App. Div. 2d 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d 893 (3d Dep't 1962). See note 44 supra.
50. The evidence presented as to causation was conflicting. Id. at 998, 233 N.Y.S.2d at 894; see
note 57 infra.
51. 12 N.Y.2d 647 (1963).
52. See, e.g., Comment, Mental Stress and Mental Injury in New York Workmen's Compen-
sation, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 727, 738-39 (1967); Comment, Mental Stimulus and Disability Under
Workmen's Compensation, 17 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 260, 266-67 (1960); 35 Notre Dame Law. 471
(1960); see text accompanying note 53 infra.
53. 1 Larson, supra note 9, § 42.23, at 7-380 to -381.
54. See 36 N.Y.2d at 509, 513, 330 N.E.2d at 603, 608, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640, 644 (majority
opinion and Breitel, C.J., dissenting).
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policies of tort and workmen's compensation; the former is intended to
compensate for loss on the basis of fault and the latter was "designed to shift the
risk of loss of earning capacity caused by industrial accidents from the worker to
industry and ultimately the consumer. '5 5 To implement the policy of workmen's
compensation, the court reasoned, the Workmen's Compensation Law should be
construed liberally in favor of the employee.5 6
The court observed that the relevant testimony as to the cause of the claimant's
mental breakdown was uncontroverted,5 7 and observed that the facts clearly
showed no physical impact was involved.5 8 It then concluded that a "mental-
mental" injury could be said to be "accidental"59 under the Workmen's
Compensation Law, noting that in any given injury-producing situation one
person may suffer a physical injury, such as a heart attack, while another may
suffer a depressive reaction. The determinative factor is the physical makeup of
the individual and his particular vulnerability. In each case, however, the
individual is equally incapable of functioning properly and should, given the
other requisites for recovery, be compensated under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Law. 60
The court then disposed of the argument that testimony regarding
psychological causation and psychological injury is unreliable. Since it had
already rejected this argument in recognizing recovery for "mental-physical" 61
55. Id. at 508, 330 N.E.2d at 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
56. Id. The court cited Heitz v. Jacob Ruppert, 218 N.Y. 148, 112 N.E. 750(1916) as authority
for this proposition. In reaching this liberal interpretation the court felt a guideline could be de-
veloped from Masse v. James H. Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 92 N. E.2d 56(1950). The Masse court
stated that a court should determine whether a given incident is an "accident" under the Workmen's
Compensation Law not by any legal definition, but by "the common sense viewpoint of the average
man." Id. at 37, 92 N.E.2d at 57. Arguably this concept is in potential conflict with the "substantial
evidence" rule, note 21 supra, since the "average man" wvill normally look to the facts and to the
credibility of the claimant so as to do justice in the individual case. Thus, while the "substantial
evidence" rule purports to prevent a court's placing its interpretation of the facts above that of the
board, this door is left slightly ajar by the "common man" approach which permits the court to take
cognizance of the facts in making its determination of the law.
The standard of doing justice in the individual case, which the court in hasse appeared to adopt,
has led to a multitude of decisions which provide few hints as to their theoretical basis of law. Larson
has stated that "it is characteristic of compensation law in New York that it is built up largely not by
long opinions of the Court of Appeals analyzing and coordinating controversial legal principles,
but by hundreds of memorandum opinions dealing with the facts of particular cases. These must be
carefully pieced together in a sort of mosaic, before the pattern is discernible." Larson, The
Positional-Risk Doctrine in Workmen's Compensation, 1973 Duke L.J. 761, 776.
57. See statement of facts preceding note 1, supra. Arguably, this fact was a key element in the
court's finding for the claimant. In both Chernin and Straws there were substantial disputes as to
causation. See notes 46 and 50 supra. Query, did the court handle this case differently from Chernin
and Straws because it felt that the claimant in Wolfe was deserving, and the claimants in Chernin and
Straws weren't? See note 56 supra.
58. 36 N.Y.2d at 508-09, 330 N.E.2d at 605, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
59. This is a threshold legal question on the issue of compensability of an injury in workmen's
compensation. See note 14 supra.
60. 36 N.Y.2d at 510, 330 N.E. at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
61. See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra.
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and "physical-mental" 62 injuries, the court was prepared to extend its reasoning
in those situations to "mental-mental" injuries. 63 This extension, the court
observed, would bring New York law into conformity with a majority of other
jurisdictions. 64
Finally, the court approached the issue of whether recovery should be allowed
for a mental injury to a "third party" or "innocent bystander.16 The court
recited the policy argument against applying tort concepts to workmen's
compensation law. 66 Rather than applying this policy, however, it effectively
sidestepped the legal issue by holding that as a matter offact the claimant was not
a"third party," but was an "active participant. ' 67 However, the court cautioned
that "[t]his is not to say that liability should be extended indefinitely, we must
consider the record before us in light of the common sense viewpoint of the
average man."
68
The dissent in Wolfe did not disagree with the concept of recovery in
"mental-mental" cases, 69 but felt that a line had to be drawn, disallowing
recovery for purely mental injuries to third persons. 70 The dissent felt that this
limitation, similar to the one drawn in tort law in Tobin v. Grossman,7 1 was
necessary to avoid "overburdening of the compensation system by injudicious
and open-ended expansion of compensation benefits .... ",72 This undue
expansion would result, the dissent believed, if recoveries were allowed in "a
myriad of commonplace occupational pursuits where employees are often
exposed to the misfortunes of others which may in the mentally unstable evoke
precisely the symptoms which the claimant [in Wolfe] suffered. '73 Workmen's
compensation law did not require this type of expansion, so the dissent argued,
because disability benefits covering such injuries are available today, while such
62. See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
63. 36 N.Y.2d at 510, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642. In buttressing its argument the
court cited Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961), which
rejected the physical contact rule in tort law. Even though the court previously had distinguished tort
law from workmen's compensation law, see text accompanying note 55 supra, it seemed to find the
urge to analogize to tort law irresistible.
64. 36 N.Y.2d at 510-11, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642. See note 42 supra.
65. 36 N.Y.2d at 511, 330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642. This concept, which is another
importation from tort law, see note 71 infra, was the main point of the dissent in Wolfe. See text
accompanying notes 69-74 infra.
66. 36 N.Y.2d at 511,330 N.E.2d at 606, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
67. Id. Thus while the court decided the "mental-mental" issue which it had left open in Chernin
and Straws, it left open another issue-that of third party recovery.
68. 36 N.Y.2d at 511, 330 N.E.2d at 607, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
69. Id. (Breitel, C.J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 512, 330 N.E.2d at 607, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (Breitel, C.J., dissenting).
71. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). In Tobin the court denied
recovery to a mother who suffered mental anguish after rushing to the scene of an accident in which
her child had been injured by a negligent driver. The court felt it necessary to reach this result because
of its responsibility "to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree." Id. at 619,
249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561.




benefits did not exist when workmen's compensation was first enacted.7 4
The dissent seemed to ignore the fact that the number of such recoveries under
workmen's compensation could be kept within reasonable bounds by the
application of the case-by-case approach which the majority espoused. 7 s This
approach would avoid the necessity of drawing narrow lines based on legal
fictions, a concept foreign to the philosophy of workmen's compensation.
76
The decision in Wolfe might best be viewed as a continuation of the "average
man" standard, geared toward achieving justice in the individual case, rather
than as another major theoretical break with the fast-dying "contact rule."
Similarly, in future cases with fact patterns analogous to those in Wolfe, Chernin
and Straws, it seems unlikely that any theoretical breakthroughs will occur. It
appears that future legal battles will be fought over the issue of "third party
recovery." The decisions, however, will in all likelihood reflect the case-by-case
analysis which is characteristic of the "average man" standard.77 If, therefore, a
claimant reaches the court of appeals with a weak factual case, the court may
refuse to decide the legal issue as long as it considers the result reached below to
be satisfactory. Arguably, then, the battles might be won or lost on the record of
the workmen's compensation board.
Joel S. Goldman
74. Id.
75. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
76. "The law should not discard one fiction-the duality between body and mind-only to
supplant it by another." Todd v. Goostree, 493 S.W.2d 411, 421 (Mo. App. 1973). Here, the new
legal fiction urged by the dissent in Wolfe, would be that there is a substantive difference between
"innocent bystanders" and "active participants," which difference, of itself, predudes recovery by
innocent bystanders.
77. See note 56 supra.
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